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THE PARTY’S OVER: ESTABLISHING 
NONPARTISAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN 
NEW YORK CITY 
Karen I. Chang* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of the last century, cities across the United 
States have increasingly been adopting nonpartisan local election 
systems.1 Today, a majority of the nation’s cities utilize 
nonpartisan elections,2 and sixty of the seventy-five largest U.S. 
cities have elected their mayors in nonpartisan elections.3 New 
York City is considering joining the majority by changing to a 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Wellesley College, 2000. 
The author would like to thank her parents, Morgan and Eileen, her sister 
Gloria, Steve Wu and Hae Jin Shim for their love, support and 
encouragement. She would also like to thank the editors of the Journal of Law 
and Policy for their invaluable comments and guidance. 
1 WILLIS D. HAWLEY, NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS AND THE CASE FOR 
PARTY POLITICS 14 (1973). 
2 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, PRELIMINARY 
OPTIONS: NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS 14 (2002) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY 
OPTIONS]. Of the fifty largest cities, only nine utilize partisan systems, 
including New York, N.Y.; Phila., Pa.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Baltimore, Md.; 
Washington, D.C.; Charlotte, N.C.; Tucson, Ariz.; Tulsa, Okla. and St. 
Louis, Mo. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, THE CITY IN 
TRANSITION: INTERIM SUCCESSION AND THE MAYORALTY, at E-12 to E-15 
(2002) [hereinafter CITY IN TRANSITION]. 
3  PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 14. Cities currently using 
nonpartisan elections include Boston, Mass.; Houston, Tex.; Dallas, Tex.; 
Detroit, Mich.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Phoenix, Ariz.; San Antonio, Tex.; San 
Diego, Cal.; San Francisco, Cal.; and Seattle, Wash. See id. 
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nonpartisan process for local elective offices.4 In July 2002, New 
York City’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed a thirteen-
member commission—including civic, community and business 
leaders—to review the election format change.5 On September 3, 
2002, the Commission decided to defer proposing the nonpartisan 
issue as a 2002 ballot referendum.6 
New Yorkers, political officials and policy analysts have 
voiced various and divergent opinions as to whether such a 
change to the local election system will benefit New York City.7 
The argument against nonpartisan elections typically focuses on 
the concern that nonpartisan elections would reduce voter 
turnout—primarily among minorities and those of lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds—by discouraging one of the primary 
“institutional mechanisms through which individuals organize 
their political decision making.”8 In contrast, advocates believe 
that in New York, where one political party heavily dominates, 
“the outcome of the elections is often effectively decided in the 
primary,” in which only a narrow subsection of eligible voters 
participate.9 They believe nonpartisan elections would open the 
decision-making process to the entire population and stimulate 
competition, which would compel candidates to address at the 
outset issues facing the broad constituency.10 
                                                          
4 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 68. Local elective offices include 
those for mayor, public advocate, council member, borough president and 
comptroller. See id. 
5 Id. at 4. 
6 Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: 
Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York 
City Charter Revision Commission (Sept. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Sept. 
3, 2002)] (statement of Robert Maguire, Chair of the 2002 Charter Revision 
Commission). 
7 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 11-13 (summarizing the scope 
of the commission’s charter revision review, including the public hearings 
held, expert testimony heard and public comments solicited). 
8 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 64. See also, infra Part III (describing the 
potential harm to voters of lower socioeconomic background as a primary 
argument against use of a nonpartisan election system). 
9 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 84-85. 
10 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 26 (reviewing arguments in 
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Structurally, nonpartisan elections eliminate the preferential 
position given to political parties in local elections; they do not, 
however, prohibit their participation in electoral campaigning.11 
Beyond the influence of a candidate’s party affiliation, other 
mechanisms that inform the local electorate enhance and 
influence the mental framework voters construct in making 
voting decisions.12 Part I of this note describes the historical 
background of nonpartisan elections in the United States, 
including the originating principles for nonpartisan elections and 
the structural changes implemented under a nonpartisan election 
format. Part II describes statutory and case law support for the 
election format change, highlighting underlying policy goals. Part 
III describes the current arguments for maintaining New York 
City’s current election format and the concerns regarding 
possible detrimental effects nonpartisan elections would have on 
the city’s electorate. Part IV argues that nonpartisan elections 
would reinvigorate New York City’s local electorate because the 
role of political parties in local elections is fundamentally 
different than those at the state or national level. Moreover, a 
nonpartisan system would significantly increase competition in 
New York City’s local elections and break down the conclusive 
role political parties play in the city’s effectively single-party 
system. Part V suggests supplemental actions and legislation that 
should be taken if and when voters decide to give nonpartisan 
                                                          
favor of nonpartisan elections, including that they would “force candidates to 
address issues facing the population as a whole, rather than the narrow group 
of insiders who tend to vote in partisan primaries”); Joseph Mercurio, 
Nonpartisan Elections: Can Bloomberg Extend His Success to Another 
Campaign Promise?, Nat’l. Pol. Serv., Inc., at http://www.nationalpolitical. 
com/column126.htm (June 21, 2002) [hereinafter Mercurio, Bloomberg’s 
Campaign Promise] (discussing the benefits of a competitive election). 
11 EUGENE C. LEE, THE POLITICS OF NONPARTISANSHIP 97 (1960). See 
infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the structures of existing nonpartisan election 
laws). 
12 See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 53 (explaining that the mass media is a 
primary source of political information, particularly when political parties are 
inactive). Other informative mechanisms include the media and the 
government-produced Voter Guide. See infra Part V.C.3.d (discussing the 
various sources of electoral information available to voters in New York). 
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elections a chance. 
I. BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS 
The history of the national and local trends toward 
nonpartisan municipal elections, as well as the variety of possible 
nonpartisan electoral structures, provide the background 
necessary to understand the policy and legal concerns at issue 
today. The current rationales for implementing nonpartisan 
elections are similar to the original motives in some respects 
while dissimilar in others, due to development within differing 
historical contexts. Understanding the different structures should 
inform New York City’s legislative drafters in the structure the 
city chooses to implement, should it decide to establish 
nonpartisan elections. 
A. Historical Background 
As the nation’s election systems formalized and increased in 
complexity at the turn of the twentieth century, state and local 
governments gained greater independence and flexibility to 
modify their election laws, which in turn stimulated the parallel 
development of nonpartisan and partisan election systems.13 
1. The National History of Nonpartisan and Partisan Elections 
Both partisan and nonpartisan local election systems grew out 
of the initial shift from voice voting to a paper ballot system in 
the late nineteenth century.14 The first paper ballot forms in the 
United States, distributed in Kentucky in 1888, tracked 
Australian and British ballots by not including party 
designation.15 A variety of nonpartisan primary election systems 
                                                          
13 See LEE, supra note 11, at 31 (discussing the link between municipal 
home rule and the freedom of local politics from national parties); infra Part 
II.A (explaining the purpose and structure of municipal home rule laws). 
14 LEE, supra note 11, at 20. 
15 Id. (describing Kentucky’s new statutory requirement that paper ballots 
be printed and distributed at the state’s expense). 
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developed in different cities, similar to the diverse systems that 
exist today.16 While nonpartisan election systems were under 
development, election reformers advocated two other related 
measures: (1) separating city elections from state and national 
elections, either by varying the date or by scheduling them for 
odd-numbered years; and (2) creating a “short ballot,” which 
entailed changing many administrative positions from elective to 
appointive positions.17 Alternating election years facilitated the 
implementation of nonpartisan elections, which required different 
ballot structures, but also reflected the general belief that 
municipal issues were reasonably separate from national 
partisanship.18 The short ballot was considered an essential 
feature in conjunction with nonpartisan elections.19 
Cities like Boston, Massachusetts, and Berkeley, California, 
began revising their election laws to implement nonpartisan 
elections in the first decade of the twentieth century.20 At the 
same time, there was movement to apply the nonpartisan ballot to 
judicial elections.21 California and Arizona were the first to adopt 
                                                          
16 Id. at 21-22. The nonpartisan election structures that developed 
included a runoff of the top two primary candidates, no runoff if a candidate 
received a majority primary vote, or no primary and a simple plurality win. 
Id; see also Part I.B (listing current nonpartisan election structures used in 
cities across the United States). 
17 LEE, supra note 11, at 22. Some nonpartisan advocates have stressed 
that nonpartisan elections necessitate the short ballot. Id. at 32 (noting the 
position held by leading nonpartisan supporter Richard Childs, Executive 
Committee Chairman of the National Municipal League in the 1950s). 
18 Id. at 22; ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY 
GOVERNMENT: THE CONSPICUOUS FAILURE, 1870-1900 283 (1974). A similar 
problem has been discussed recently with regard to the ability of voting 
machines to handle nonpartisan and partisan election formats simultaneously. 
See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 95-96. The Charter Revision 
Committee’s staff members, however, have stated that available federal and 
state funding sources will provide sufficient resources to procure new 
machines capable of implementing this change. Id. at 98. 
19 LEE, supra note 11, at 22. 
20 Id. at 22-23 (describing the earliest movement to nonpartisan systems, 
and noting that “[o]ther California cities quickly followed suit”). 
21 LEE, supra note 11, at 23 n.11 (indicating that in 1950, seventeen 
states held nonpartisan judicial elections). 
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this system, and other states soon followed.22 
In 1888, the same year that Kentucky implemented a 
nonpartisan ballot, Massachusetts adopted a ballot that included 
party designation.23 Massachusetts’s decision to use a partisan 
ballot sought to resolve the problem voters experienced in 
elections that utilized laundry list ballots—ballots including a 
dozen or more offices with no identifiable party affiliation or 
endorsement.24 Adding party affiliation to the ballot created the 
need to legally define “political party” and to recognize party 
nominations of candidates at the primary level.25 State, district 
and local governmental regulation followed the development of 
formalized party activity, and nominating conventions became 
their regulatory focus.26 Nominating convention laws made way 
for state-wide direct primary laws, in which party candidates are 
elected by the general party membership.27 
Nonpartisan elections became a major municipal reform issue 
during the Progressive Era, a movement at the turn of the 
twentieth century that sought to combat the corruption within city 
governments controlled by political party bosses.28 The municipal 
reform movement was premised on the lack of trust in political 
                                                          
22 Id. at 23. 
23 Id. at 21. 
24 Id. In 1909, however, Boston became the first large city to establish 
nonpartisan elections. Doug Muzzio, Editorial, Nonpartisan Elections and 
Charter Revision, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 2003 [hereinafter Muzzio, 
Charter Revision], available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/voting/ 
20030122/17/196. 
25 LEE, supra note 11, at 21. A political party was defined as “an 
organization casting a certain percentage of the aggregate vote.” Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Nancy Northup, Local Nonpartisan Elections, Political Parties and 
the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677 (1987) (reviewing the origins 
of the widespread establishment of nonpartisan elections). See also HAWLEY, 
supra note 1, at 8 (offering analysis of the “elitist origins of nonpartisanship in 
city politics”). Besides “elite” reformers, the progressives also included 
journalists and civic and religious leaders angered by increasing urban poverty 
and poor living and working conditions. Id. at 9. As Hawley explains, the 
motives that drove activists were often contradictory. Id. 
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parties and politicians and the belief that “[c]ity government is 
largely a matter of ‘good business practice’ . . . or . . . 
‘municipal housekeeping,’” in which the issues of a city council 
are only minimally political in nature.29 Thus, the municipal 
progressive movement emphasized efficiency and economy as its 
leading objectives.30 
Since the Progressive Era, most cities have established 
nonpartisan municipal elections.31 As of 1991, approximately 
three-fourths of all municipalities in the United States utilized 
nonpartisan elections.32 Although the massive municipal 
corruption that fueled the nonpartisan movement during the 
Progressive Era is no longer an articulated premise for switching 
to a nonpartisan election format,33 advocacy for nonpartisan 
                                                          
29 LEE, supra note 11, at 28. 
30 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 9. Some went as far as analogizing the city 
to a corporation. Id. at 10 (quoting Andrew D. White, a leading reformer and 
the President of Cornell University in 1890). At the same time, White and 
other reformers also shared the elitist notion that a partisan system was 
dangerous in that it would theoretically allow the city to be controlled by the 
urban poor and new immigrants. Id. 
31 See id. at 14 (describing the increase in the number of cities 
establishing nonpartisan municipal elections between the 1930s and 1960s); 
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 82 (describing the current use of 
nonpartisan elections by “an overwhelming majority of cities across the 
nation”). 
32 See Schaffner et al., Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot 
in State and Local Elections, 54 POL. RES. Q. 1 (Mar. 2001). 
33 For example, Chicago, Ill., was among five of the ten largest cities that 
were notoriously corrupt at the end of the nineteenth century. GRIFFITH, supra 
note 18, at 10 (describing the extent of corruption across the country and 
noting that political parties were usually involved in the municipal corruption). 
When Chicago established nonpartisan elections for citywide public offices for 
the 1999 elections, however, its primary impetus was not to rectify corrupt 
government practices but to improve cost-efficiency in light of the hybrid 
election systems used between aldermen and citywide officeholders and the 
reality that the primary became the more important election due to the 
dominance of Democratic voters. See Scott Fornek, The Party’s Over: 
Mayoral Primaries Get the Ax, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 8, 1995, at 1 
(discussing the elimination of party primaries in Chicago’s mayoral elections). 
Moreover, because of the party’s historical dominance over Chicago’s local 
elections, a majority of Chicago Republicans had chosen to vote in Democratic 
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elections continues under a broader set of rationales. Some 
continue to support the nonpartisan format on the historical view 
of local governance as more operational than political.34 Others, 
however, view the political party hierarchy as having too much 
control over the outcome of elections, causing candidates to be 
more accountable to the party institution than to the public.35 
Supporters of nonpartisan elections consider the nonpartisan 
structure as returning candidate accountability to the people and 
their community issues.36 
2. The History of Nonpartisan Elections in New York City 
New York City was a paradigm of the corruption that fueled 
the Progressive movement. In the 1860s and 1870s, New York 
City was under the control of the “Tweed Ring,” the political 
machine that exercised political dominance through combined 
acts of charity and patronage.37 Under the control of Party 
“Boss” William Marcy Tweed, the city was, among other things, 
                                                          
primaries, a sign that the existing party primary system was not effective. 
Steve Neal, Established Candidates Benefit from New Rules, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 1998, at 9. The Illinois General Assembly passed the election law in 
1995, thereby unifying their system of electing aldermen (analogous to New 
York’s city council members) and citywide officeholders. Id.; Thomas Hardy, 
Edgar is Set To End City Partisan Votes, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1995, at 3. 
34 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 28 (summarizing supporters’ 
belief that because city government is largely operational, “the value of the 
party banner and the ideals it represents is minimal at best”). 
35 See, e.g., Neal, supra note 33 (pointing out that the Democratic Party 
has owned Chicago’s City Hall since 1931). 
36 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 84 (summarizing comments from 
public officials and the public in support of nonpartisan elections); e.g., Id. at 
E-7 (summarizing Professor Fred Siegal’s contention that the existing election 
system in New York City fails to ensure that officials are accountable to the 
public). 
37 See GRIFFITH, supra note 18, at 71-73. The political machine gained 
the loyalty of new immigrants by assisting them in obtaining employment and 
pre-election citizenship. Id. at 72-73. The new immigrants expressed their 
thanks through their votes, overlooking electoral fraud and financial abuses. 
Id. 
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defrauded of millions of dollars.38 The efforts of reformers and 
the New York Times in exposing the Tweed Ring corruption 
finally brought an end to their control in 1871.39 Yet, unlike 
cities whose corruption led to implementation of nonpartisan 
elections, the corruption in New York City at that did not result 
in a change in its electoral system. 
In the early 1960s, a task force was appointed to review New 
York City government.40 The task force examined nonpartisan 
mayoral elections in large cities of comparable size.41 They 
decided not to implement them in New York, however, because 
they found that in other large cities, voters were still well aware 
of the party backings of candidates, and if the premise for 
changing to nonpartisan elections was to remove the party from 
the election process, nonpartisan elections would fail to do so.42 
In 1986, New York City voters approved special nonpartisan 
elections through a referendum, which amended certain 
provisions of the City Charter, including the method of filling 
vacancies for City Council or Borough President.43 Under the 
post-referendum provisions, special election candidates are 
nominated by independent petitions rather than by party 
committee, and party affiliation may not be included on the 
ballot.44 In 1991, the New York City Board of Elections refused 
to comply with the new charter provisions, claiming that the 
provisions contradicted New York State Election Law, which 
allows party labels, and arguing that city rules must yield to state 
                                                          
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 69, 74. 
40 See Edward Costikyan, Editorial, The Case Against Bloomberg’s 
Charter Revisions on the Mayor’s First Major Misstep—A Plan That Calls For 
a ‘Well-Deserved Death,’ N.Y. SUN, July 29, 2002, at 6. Costikyan was 
appointed by former governor Nelson Rockefeller to head this task force. Id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See Dick Zander, Minority Challenge to Charter Change, NEWSDAY, 
Nov. 28, 1988, at 20. 
44 See Cerisse Anderson, Party Designation Barred in Special Council 
Election, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 1991, at 1. 
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law.45 Thomas J. Manton, Chairman of the Democratic Executive 
Committee of Queens County, intervened and contended that the 
nonpartisan provisions violated his party’s First Amendment right 
to free speech.46 The Supreme Court of New York upheld the 
charter revisions, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding no 
contradiction between the state law and the charter revision and 
no First Amendment violation.47 
New York’s Municipal Home Rule Law provides for 
appointment of a charter revision commission in New York City 
through, among other methods, mayoral action.48 The 
Commission is charged with reviewing the City Charter and 
proposing a new charter or revising the existing one.49 Former 
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani began researching the possibility of 
implementing nonpartisan elections for all municipal offices in 
1998.50 The New York City Charter Revision Commission has 
since annually examined the possible benefits and disadvantages 
of such a procedural change.51 The 1998, 1999 and 2001 
Commissions examined the possibility of establishing nonpartisan 
                                                          
45 City of New York v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, 
at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d,    A.D.2d    (1st Dept.), appeal 
denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991). In New York City Board of 
Elections, the city sued to enjoin the Board of Elections from including the 
party affiliation of a Queens County City Council candidate on the special 
election ballot, pursuant to the newly established nonpartisan rules. Id. See 
infra Part II.C (detailing the court’s holding regarding this contradiction). 
46 New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, at 6 (citing Eu v. San 
Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)). The court 
distinguished Eu, however, noting that the statute in Eu, prohibiting political 
parties from endorsing candidates in the primaries, was much more severely 
restrictive than was the case at issue. Id.; see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29430 
(2003) (stating that the official governing bodies “shall not endorse, support, 
or oppose, any candidate for nomination by that party for partisan office in the 
direct primary election”); Eu, 489 U.S. at 217 (citing section 29430 of 
California’s Election Code).  
47 New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, at 6. 
48 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36 (2002). 
49 Id. 
50 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, MAKING OUR 
CITY’S PROGRESS PERMANENT 104 (2001) [hereinafter CITY’S PROGRESS]. 
51 Id. 
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elections.52 Although concluding that nonpartisan elections would 
be beneficial to New York City, the Commissions deferred the 
issue for further studies.53 Giuliani’s 2001 Commission believed 
that one reason for the lack of spirited, substantive policy debate 
about the city’s future, even as the 2001 primary election 
approached, was that the city’s partisan election system “tend[ed] 
to foster uniformity, rather than diversity of ideas.”54 They 
pointed out that this homogeneous perspective was perpetuated by 
the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic Party among the 
New York City electorate.55 The Commission’s findings were not 
considered full and fair because the members were widely seen as 
Giuliani’s personal political tools, chosen to advocate Giuliani’s 
position in support of nonpartisan elections rather than conduct 
an independent evaluation of the policy benefits and burdens of 
such a change.56 
In 2002, Mayor Bloomberg, perhaps recognizing the lack of 
credibility given to the Giuliani commissions, appointed diverse, 
independent members.57 The thirteen members began examining 
                                                          
52 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 14-18 (summarizing the 1998, 
1999 and 2001 commissions’ findings and actions). 
53 CITY’S PROGRESS, supra note 50, at 104. 
54 Id. at 105. 
55 Id. More than sixty-five percent of all registered voters are members of 
the Democratic Party. See New York State Bd. of Elections, Voter Enrollment 
for November 2002, at http://www.elections.state.ny.us/enrollment/enroll. 
htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). About eighty percent of voters who are 
registered with a party are registered Democrats. Id. 
56 Douglas Muzzio, Editorial, Bloomberg Jumps the Gun on Charter 
Reform, NEWSDAY, July 25, 2002, at A35 [hereinafter Muzzio, Bloomberg 
Jumps Gun] (noting that Giuliani appointed three commissions, all chaired by 
close associates who had served as deputy mayors). See also Eric Lipton, 
Editorial, From Giuliani, a Pitch to Put Parties Aside, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 
2001, at B3 (describing the connections between various Charter Revision 
Commission members and Giuliani and his administration). 
57 Muzzio, Bloomberg Jumps Gun, supra note 56. See also Editorial, 
Charter Reform, Slowly, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2002, at 22 
(“Bloomberg’s panel . . . has proved to be as independent as he said it would 
be”); Michael Cooper, Mayor Calls Charter Panel’s Rejection of His Plan 
Proof of Its Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at B7 (noting that the 
commission’s decision to defer proposing a ballot referendum, which he 
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nonpartisan elections but again deferred making a decision.58 In 
doing so, the Commission considered input from local 
community leaders and members of the general public, as well as 
information from a staff with expertise in city government and 
the charter revision process.59 The Commission’s decision largely 
reflected concerns voiced by the public—that the review process 
required further public comment and review and that the hearings 
were held during August, when many people are on vacation.60 
3. Mayor Bloomberg’s Premises for Establishing 
Nonpartisan Elections 
Nonpartisan elections were among the leading proposals 
promoted by Mayor Bloomberg at the outset of his mayoral 
campaign.61 Bloomberg stated that he did not believe the role 
political parties play is as central to local governance as it is to 
national governance.62 He described the current partisan elections 
as allowing “a very small group of people [to] determine who 
gets elected” because a proportionately small number of voters 
actually participate in the primary.63 He expressed hope that 
nonpartisan elections would increase the competitiveness of the 
city’s local elections64 and believed the nonpartisan system would 
                                                          
disagreed with, showed their independence); Dan Janison, Mayor’s Charter 
Panel a Varied Crew, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2002, at A11 (describing the varied 
backgrounds of the 2002 Charter Revision Commission members, which 
include members who have had ideological and political conflicts with Mayor 
Bloomberg). 
58 Hearing (Sept. 3, 2002), supra note 6 (statement of Robert Maguire, 
Chair of the 2002 Charter Revision Commission). 
59 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 11-13 (discussing the review 
procedures used by the 2002 Charter Revision Commission). 
60 Id. at 12. 
61 Adam Nagourney, Bloomberg Says Elections Should Be Nonpartisan, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2001, at B4. Bloomberg is a quintessential nonpartisan 
advocate, as a Democrat-turned-Republican, whose election received the 
support of the Independent Party. See id. 
62 Id. 
63 Muzzio, Charter Revision, supra note 24 (quoting Mayor Bloomberg). 
64 Id. (noting a suggestion made by a Bloomberg advisor). 
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increase opportunities for candidates to run for an elected 
position without submitting to the party hierarchy.65 Bloomberg 
also speculated that by taking parties out of their current position 
of power more people would participate in the political process.66 
B. The Structure of Nonpartisan Elections: What It Is and 
What It Isn’t 
One of the primary misconceptions about nonpartisan 
elections is that they absolutely restrict political parties from 
playing any role in the campaign and election process.67 
Understanding the various ways in which nonpartisan elections 
are, or are not, structured illuminates the purposes underlying the 
current nonpartisan movement. 
1. Existing Nonpartisan Election Structures 
In cities with nonpartisan elections, candidates are placed on 
the general election ballot either by nominating petition or by 
advancing from a nonpartisan primary.68 In nonpartisan cities that 
                                                          
65 Adam Nagourney, Bloomberg Says Elections Should Be Nonpartisan, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2001, at B4 (quoting Bloomberg, who stated, “You’ve 
got to get rid of the partisan politics and party bosses who really limit the 
public’s choice”). 
66 Muzzio, Charter Revision, supra note 24 (quoting Bloomberg’s 
advisor). 
67 See, e.g., Press Release, New York State Democratic Committee, 
Statement from State Chair Herman “Denny” Farrell, Jr., Reports That 
Mayor Bloomberg Will Try to Reduce the Role of Major Political Parties in 
New York City Elections (June 17, 2002) [hereinafter “Press Release, Denny 
Farrell”] (opposing nonpartisan elections by emphasizing the benefits political 
parties provide to the electoral process), available at http://www.nydems.org/ 
press/pr-06-17-02.html. 
68 Northup, supra note 28, at 1683. Independent nominations are used to 
reduce the number of candidates eligible to be placed on the primary ballot or 
on the general election ballot when primaries are not used. See, e.g., 
ALBUQUERQUE CITY CHARTER art. 2 § 3 (1971) (requiring a candidate to 
submit a petition with a specified number of signatures to be placed on the 
ballot), available at http://www.amlegal.com/albuquerque_nm/; L.A. CITY 
CHARTER § 422 (2000) (using nominating petitions “to qualify a candidate for 
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do not hold primaries, the candidate who wins the most votes 
wins the election.69 In cities that utilize primaries, all candidates 
run in a nonpartisan primary in which all qualified voters are 
eligible to participate.70 In some cities, a runoff election is held 
only if no candidate receives a majority of votes.71 In such cases, 
the primary usually becomes the deciding election. Several cities, 
on the other hand, always advance two candidates to the general 
election, regardless of whether any candidate receives a 
majority.72 
Independent petitions are used to nominate candidates either 
to the general ballot or to the primary ballot.73 The petitions 
require candidates to obtain a threshold number of signatures 
before their name can be placed on the ballot.74 Party affiliation 
                                                          
placement on the primary nominating ballot), available at 
http://www2.lacity.org. 
69 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E12 to E15. Those cities 
include Memphis, Tenn.; Fort Worth, Tex.; Portland, Ore.; Albuquerque, 
N.M.; Virginia Beach, Va.; Colorado Springs, Colo. and Santa Ana, Cal. Id. 
70 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 68. See also CITY IN 
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 104 (proposing a draft of a city charter 
amendment to provide for nonpartisan elections and requiring that “[e]very 
qualified voter shall be entitled to vote at such nonpartisan primary election”). 
71 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E12 to E15. Those cities 
include Los Angeles, Cal.; Chicago, Ill.; Houston, Tex.; Phoenix, Ariz.; San 
Diego, Cal.; Dallas, Tex.; San Antonio, Tex.; Detroit, Mich.; San Jose, Cal.; 
Jacksonville, Fla.; Columbus, Ohio; Austin, Tex.; Milwaukee, Wis.; 
Nashville-Davidson, Tenn.; El Paso, Tex.; Denver, Colo.; Oklahoma City, 
Okla.; New Orleans, La.; Las Vegas, Nev.; Long Beach, Cal.; Fresno, Cal.; 
Atlanta, Ga; Sacramento, Cal.; Oakland, Cal.; Mesa, Ariz.; and Honolulu, 
Haw. Id. 
72 Id. Those cities include Boston, Mass.; Seattle, Wash.; Cleveland, 
Ohio (only if the top two candidates each received over one percent of the 
vote); Kansas City, Kan.; Omaha, Neb.; Miami, Fla.; Minneapolis, Minn. 
and Wichita, Kan. Id. 
73 See Northup, supra note 28, at 1683. 
74 See, e.g., L.A. CITY CHARTER § 422 (2000) (requiring any candidate 
for mayor, city attorney, controller and member of the city council to collect 
signatures of 500 registered voters to be placed on the primary nominating 
ballot), available at http://www2.lacity.org; 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 
20/21-28 (West 2003) (requiring candidates for city alderman in Chicago to 
collect signatures aggregating “not less than 2% of the total number of votes 
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is not included in any of the nomination papers, nor is it included 
on the ballot.75 
2. New York City’s Proposed Nonpartisan Election Structure 
In the nonpartisan election structure considered by the 2002 
Charter Revision Commission, candidates’ party affiliations, if 
any, are not denoted on the ballot.76 The charter revision draft 
                                                          
cast for mayor at the last preceding municipal election divided by the number 
of wards”). 
75 Northup, supra note 28, at 1683. The most common attribute of 
nonpartisan elections is the elimination of party designation or support from 
election ballots. See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 68 (noting that the 
essential difference between partisan and nonpartisan elections is whether a 
candidate’s party affiliation is denoted on the ballot). The structural change of 
listing candidates on the ballot without respective party affiliation labels has 
only an incidental legal effect upon political parties in terms of their right to 
participate. See Pl.’s Reply Mem. of Law at 4, City of New York v. New 
York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), 
aff’d, __ A.D.2d __ (1st Dept.), appeal denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 
10, 1991). Under the nonpartisan format, parties may still “circulate 
independent nominating petitions; they may endorse candidates; they may 
encourage people to vote for particular candidates; they may, in short, carry 
on all their normal functions except that of directly nominating a candidate.” 
Id. (explaining the various functions that political parties may still conduct as 
part of the campaign process). 
76 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at i. The removal of the party 
label from election ballots is the hallmark of nonpartisan elections. See, e.g., 
L.A. CITY CHARTER § 424 (2000) (stating that “[t]here shall be nothing on 
any ballot indicative of the party affiliation, source of candidacy or support of 
any candidate”), available at The Official Web Site of The City of Los 
Angeles, http://www2.lacity.org. See alsoCITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, 
at 104 (setting forth section sixty-nine of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections 
Chapter”). 
There shall be no partisan, party or independent body identification, 
symbol or emblem of any kind for the candidates for the offices of 
mayor, comptroller, public advocate, member of the council, and 
borough president on the ballot or voting machine at a nonpartisan 
primary election or general election conducted pursuant to this 
chapter. 
Id. 
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provided for a primary election and specified that the two 
candidates receiving the most votes would always advance to a 
runoff election in November.77 
The proposed election format for New York City would not 
prohibit political parties from endorsing, supporting or opposing 
candidates.78 Unlike nonpartisan elections, which attempt to 
statutorily eliminate party activism, the nonpartisan structure 
proposed by the city would modify only the formal roles parties 
currently play in the various stages of the election process, 
including the implementation of the closed party primary and 
placement of party labels on the ballot.79 In effect, the political 
                                                          
77  CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, 104 (providing section sixty-eight 
of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). This structure is similar to that 
in place in Boston and Seattle. See id. at E12 to E15 (briefly describing the 
election systems in Boston and Seattle). 
78 The proposed nonpartisan election system does not establish “absolute” 
nonpartisan elections, which the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional. See 
Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990). In Geary, an official 
prohibition of party endorsements, approved by referendum, was held to 
unconstitutionally violate the First Amendment right of political parties to free 
expression, as well as the right of party members to receive an unrestricted 
flow of political information. See id. at n.4 (citing the provisions of the 
California Elections Code banning party primaries and party labels). 
California’s nonpartisan statutes removed the statutory role of political parties 
by banning the use of party primaries and party labels on the ballot, but they 
did not prohibit political party endorsements. Id. at 282. Nevertheless, due to 
the ambiguous legal status of party endorsements in electoral campaigns, 
political parties did not endorse candidates in the majority of California 
counties. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that election laws 
prohibiting political parties from making primary endorsements violated the 
First Amendment freedom of speech and association and failed to serve any 
compelling interest. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 
489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989). 
 Unlike in California, New York’s proposed system would merely remove 
party labels from election ballots and allow all qualified voters to vote in the 
primary; it would not prohibit political parties from endorsing candidates 
during the campaign process. See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102-
04 (providing, inter alia, “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter” sections 
sixty-five and sixty-nine, which establish a nonpartisan primary and prohibit 
any partisan designations from being placed on the ballot). 
79 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 68 (describing the statutory 
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party would be reduced to the same legal status in the political 
arena as all other groups in the local community, whether social, 
religious, economic or geographical.80 
II. NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY FOR NONPARTISAN 
ELECTIONS 
The legal authority for states and municipalities to conduct 
nonpartisan elections includes state, local and federal statutes and 
regulations, as well as judicial determinations interpreting the 
statutes. These authorities define the extent and limit the scope of 
state and local power in establishing their election formats. 
A. State and Local Statutory Authority for Nonpartisan 
Elections 
Nonpartisan elections have existed in New York State since 
the early twentieth century under New York State’s Home Rule 
Law, which implicitly authorizes cities to adopt nonpartisan 
elections by charter amendment.81 Section 10 of New York 
State’s Municipal Home Rule Law authorizes cities to adopt local 
laws related to “the powers, duties, qualifications, number, [and] 
mode of selection . . . of its officers . . . .”82 The purpose of 
                                                          
differences between a partisan and nonpartisan system). 
80 LEE, supra note 11, at 97. 
81 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (2002); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 
(2000). See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 76. New York’s Municipal 
Home Rule Law was established in 1924. See Bareham v. Rochester, 158 
N.E. 51, 53 (1927). 
82 § 10 (emphasis added). This Home Rule Law directly derives from 
Article IX, section 2(c) of the New York State Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. 
IX, § 2 (2000) (providing that local governments have the power to “adopt 
and amend local laws [regarding the] . . . mode of selection . . . of its 
officers . . .”). Local election structures may differ from those codified in 
New York’s state election laws, which provide that “[w]here a specific 
provision of law exists in any other law which is inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, such provision shall apply unless a provision of this 
chapter specifies that such provision of this chapter shall apply notwithstanding 
any other provision of law.” N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-102 (McKinney 2003); see 
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home rule is “to prevent centralization of power in the state, and 
to continue, preserve, and expand local self-government.”83 
The cities of Sherrill and Watertown instituted nonpartisan 
primary systems in 1916 and 1920, respectively.84 Under their 
original nonpartisan election procedures, the two candidates 
receiving the most votes in the nonpartisan primary advanced to 
the general election, regardless of party affiliation.85 Party labels 
remained on the ballot, but the law effectively allowed two 
candidates from the same party to compete in the general 
election.86 
B. The Federal Voting Rights Act 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) examines 
whether changes in voting procedures, including a change to 
nonpartisan elections, will result in “a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color . . . .”87 Such denial or abridgment is found: 
[I]f, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown 
that the political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of 
                                                          
CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 76. 
83 People ex rel. Metro. St. Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 67 
N.E. 69, 72 (1903). See also City of New York v. New York City Bd. of 
Elections, No. 41450/91, at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d, __ A.D.2d 
__ (1st Dept.), appeal denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991) 
(explaining that New York State Election Law confers upon municipalities the 
power to establish their own local laws). 
84 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 78. 
85 Id. at 79. 
86 Id. Sherrill’s current city charter, however, removes the party label 
from all ballots for local elective offices. SHERRILL CITY CHARTER, tit. XIV § 
206 (Sept. 2001) (requiring that “[a]ll ballots [including primary, regular and 
special election ballots] used in all elections held under authority of this act 
shall . . . be without party mark or designation”), available at http://www. 
sherrillny.org. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2003). The DOJ is the federal agency charged 
with enforcing the Voting Rights Act. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2003). 
CHANGMACROX.DOC 7/7/03 11:22 AM 
 NONPARTISAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN NYC 597 
citizens protected by [42 USC 1973(a)] . . . in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.88 
Under the Federal Voting Rights Act, New York City must 
obtain preclearance from the DOJ before officially amending its 
election laws.89 The 2002 Charter Revision Commission hired an 
expert in voting rights, Dr. Allan Lichtman, to examine whether 
any such violations would arise if New York City were to 
implement nonpartisan elections.90 Dr. Lichtman analyzed New 
                                                          
88 § 1973(b) (emphasis added). 
89 See § 1973(c) (codifying section 5 of the Federal Voting Rights Act); 
28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2003) (listing the jurisdictions covered under the 
preclearance section of the Voting Rights Act, including Bronx, Kings and 
New York Counties). The DOJ reviews any voting procedure changes made in 
cities subject to preclearance to ensure they do not discriminate on account of 
race or color. See app. to 28 C.F.R. § 51.1(a) (2003). If the procedural 
change will be decided by referendum, jurisdictions may seek prospective 
review. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.22 (2003): 
With respect to a change for which approval by referendum . . . is 
required, the [U.S.] Attorney General may make a determination 
concerning the change prior to such approval if the change is not 
subject to alteration in the final approving action and if all other 
action necessary for approval has been taken. 
Id. According to Gerry Hebert, former chief of the Voting Rights Section of 
the DOJ, among the 152 requests for preclearance, in which review was 
limited to their change to nonpartisan elections, all were approved. Charter 
Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: Hearing on 
Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York City Charter 
Revision Commission (Aug. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 23, 2002)] 
(statement of Gerry Hebert). Hebert explained that the only time the DOJ 
denied preclearance was for a change in school board elections in Georgetown 
County, South Carolina in 1994, where the new rule prohibited party 
endorsement during the campaign. Id.; CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 
C-31. 
90 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 81. Dr. Lichtman was hired by 
the 1998, 1999 and 2002 commissions to perform statistical analyses. Id. Dr. 
Lichtman has served as an expert witness for many minority civil rights 
organizations, including the NAACP, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 
Education Fund and the Mexican Legal Defense and Education Fund. Charter 
Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: Hearing on 
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York City’s voting patterns from the 1989, 1993 and 1997 
general elections, examining whether nonpartisan elections would 
violate the Voting Rights Act by reducing minority turnout or 
harming minorities’ ability to elect their candidate of choice and 
concluded that the nonpartisan format would not violate the Act.91 
He also examined voting patterns in other cities using partisan 
and nonpartisan systems for comparison.92 
1. Minority Turnout 
To evaluate whether minority voter turnout was harmed more 
by nonpartisan elections disproportionately, Dr. Lichtman 
examined voter turnout patterns in New York City’s nonpartisan 
special elections between 1992 and 1998.93 The statistics showed 
that changes in minority and white turnout depended on whether 
the election district had a larger minority or white population.94 
Moreover, minority turnout increased when there was a 
competitive minority candidate on the ballot.95 His results showed 
no particular detriment to minority voter turnout in New York 
City’s special elections in comparison to white voter turnout.96 
                                                          
Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York City Charter 
Revision Commission (Aug. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002)] 
(statement of Dr. Lichtman, chair of the History Department at American 
University and noted Voting Rights expert). 
91 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 81. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(2) 
(2003) (stating that the Attorney General, in reviewing changes in electoral 
systems, will consider as a factor “the extent to which minorities have been 
denied an equal opportunity to influence elections and the decisionmaking of 
elected officials in the jurisdiction”). 
92 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 90 (describing the extent of Dr. 
Lichtman’s study, which included an examination of the partisan and 
nonpartisan electoral systems of the nation’s 100 largest cities and their effect 
on minority voting power). 
93 Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman). 
94 Id. 
95 Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman). 
See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the correlation between minority candidate 
competitiveness and increased minority turnout). 
96 Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman 
explaining that minority voter turnout patterns in New York City’s special 
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Similar to these findings, the special elections held in other 
major cities—including Washington, D.C., Memphis, Tennessee 
and Chicago, Illinois—showed no divergent pattern of minority 
turnout compared to white turnout, based on whether the system 
was nonpartisan or partisan.97 The primary factor affecting 
minority voter turnout in those cities was the competitiveness of 
the election, not the partisan or nonpartisan nature of the election 
system.98 
2. Minorities’ Ability to Elect Their Candidates of Choice 
Dr. Lichtman also analyzed the success of minority 
candidates under nonpartisan election systems as a gauge to 
determine whether the election format change would diminish 
opportunities for minorities to elect their candidate(s) of choice.99 
Minority candidate success gives a fair approximation of the 
electoral success of minority voters because of their tendency to 
vote for candidates of their race.100 
In his examination of election results in the fifty largest cities, 
Dr. Lichtman found not only that party identification was 
unnecessary for minority candidates to be elected, but also that a 
positive correlation exists between nonpartisan systems and the 
election of black and Hispanic mayors.101 Of those fifty cities, 
                                                          
elections from 1992 to 1998 varied based on whether the district was a 
majority-minority district, not based on the use of a nonpartisan election 
system). In fact, he found that the same voter turnout patterns existed in white 
voter turnout during those elections, i.e., that white voter turnout decreased in 
majority-minority districts. Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E-2; see 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(2) 
(2003). 
100 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E-2. Dr. Lichtman’s analysis of 
minority voter turnout in New York City special elections between 1992 and 
1998 also indicates this tendency. See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 
(statement of Dr. Lichtman). 
101 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 82. Dr. Susan Welch, a 
professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University, was also 
retained by the commission to examine Dr. Lichtman’s analysis, and she 
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forty-one utilized nonpartisan elections and nine administered 
partisan elections.102 Of the forty-one cities holding nonpartisan 
elections, thirty-four percent have elected minority mayors, 
compared with twenty-two percent in the cities using partisan 
elections.103 Moreover, cities that do not have majority-minority 
populations have also elected minority mayors under nonpartisan 
systems.104 
Dr. Lichtman also examined minority vote cohesiveness to 
see whether partisan systems, which are generally unifying 
structures,105 would help New York City’s minorities elect 
candidates of their race.106 He found that although the three major 
minority groups in the city—black, Hispanic and Asian—each 
have greater membership in the Democratic Party than the 
Republican Party, whites constitute a substantial plurality in the 
Democratic Party.107 Moreover, the different minority groups in 
the city do not tend to unite behind a single candidate and thus 
                                                          
agreed with his conclusion. Id. at 92. On the other hand, she also expressed 
concerns that voters would lose the benefits commonly associated with partisan 
election systems. See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing the benefits that political 
parties bring to elections). 
102 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at D-1. 
103 Id. 
104 Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: 
Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York 
City Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 
22, 2002)] (statement of Don Borut). For example, Houston and Dallas both 
currently have African American mayors, but their minority populations do 
not comprise a majority of their populations. Id. 
105 See Kenneth Sherrill, The Dangers of Non-Partisan Elections to 
Democracy, 2 SOC. POL’Y 15, 17 (1998) (explaining that parties “provide for 
collective behavior [and] collective responsibility” based on rational 
expectations that “if a party . . . nominates a candidate, citizens have a 
reasonable expectation that . . . the candidate shares the party’s general 
perspective”). 
106 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-15. 
107 Id. at C-14. Within the Democratic Party, non-Hispanic whites 
constitute forty-four percent, blacks thirty percent, Hispanics twenty percent, 
Asians three percent and others three percent. Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra 
note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman citing statistics from 2001 exit polls in 
New York City). 
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dominate neither the Democratic primary nor the final election 
results.108 The statistics regarding minority voting in cities 
administering nonpartisan elections, together with broader 
analyses of voting patterns in New York City, indicate that 
nonpartisan elections will not violate the Voting Rights Act and 
may in fact enhance minority voting power. 
C. State and Local Judicial Authority for Nonpartisan 
Elections 
Courts have upheld local nonpartisan election systems in New 
York.109 In Bareham v. City of Rochester, the New York Court of 
Appeals reviewed various local legislative amendments passed by 
Rochester’s City Council.110 Among other things, the court 
examined the council’s revisions to local provisions that 
abolished the party primary and prohibited placing party labels 
on the ballot.111 Finding the provisions statutorily and 
constitutionally valid,112 the court resolved a question regarding 
the validity of local election laws that are inconsistent with the 
state election law.113 The court found that municipalities were 
                                                          
108 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-14. 
109 See infra notes 110-22 (summarizing judicial authority for nonpartisan 
elections in New York). 
110 Bareham v. City of Rochester, 158 N.E. 51 (1927). 
111 Id. at 148. 
112 Id. at 145 (“The local law springs from the Home Rule statute and that 
statute descends from the [State] Constitution.”). 
113 Id. Article 2, section 10 of the State Constitution required all 
municipal officers whose election was not provided for within the Constitution 
to be elected by the electors of such cities. Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 
(2000). The State electors’ method utilized party primaries to elect such 
officers, in contradiction to Rochester’s new local election laws, which 
abolished the party primary and removed the party label from the ballot. 
Bareham, 158 N.E. at 54. The court determined that the state and local laws 
were not fatally inconsistent, but that the state’s Municipal Home Rule Law 
creates a specific method for cities to supercede the general state election law 
with regard to its method of electing local officers. Id.; NY MUN. HOME 
RULE LAW §11 (1924), cited in Bareham, 158 N.E. 51 at 53. Moreover, the 
Municipal Home Rule Law from which the local election laws were derived 
descended from the State Constitution, making both the Municipal Home Rule 
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empowered to modify their local election laws in so far as the 
laws affect the election of local officials.114 
Bareham states that “[t]he term ‘mode of selection’ expresses 
an intent to allow a city to determine not only that it shall cause 
its officers either to be elected or appointed but connotes also that 
a municipality may define the precise method by which either an 
election or appointment shall be effected.”115 The court thus held 
that cities in New York possess the authority to establish 
nonpartisan elections.116 The decision emphasized that Section 10 
of New York’s Municipal Home Law Rule left the decision of 
local election format to the city.117 Moreover, the state election 
law granted local municipalities legislative deference in 
structuring election procedures.118 
New York City’s authority to adopt nonpartisan elections was 
upheld in City of New York v. New York City Board of 
Elections.119 There, the New York County Supreme Court upheld 
New York City Charter Section 25(b)(7), which removed party 
labels from nonpartisan special election ballots for City Council 
                                                          
Law and the local election laws valid under state law. Id. The court stated that 
as long as the city’s laws do not overstep their bounds (e.g., by attempting to 
regulate other cities’ election methods) such city laws will be upheld. Id. at 
55. 
114 Bareham, 158 N.E. at 54. 
115 Id. at 146. See supra Part II.A (discussing New York’s Municipal 
Home Rule Law). 
116 Id. at 144. The court stated that the revised provisions of the City 
Charter that provide for nonpartisan local elections “do not conflict with the 
[State] Constitution and that no fatal inconsistency exists between them and the 
Election Law.” Id. The holding in Bareham struck down the Rochester law, 
however, due to the legislature’s failure to cite the election law provisions 
being superceded, as required by municipal statute. Id. at 149. 
117 Id. at 144. 
118 City of New York v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91, 
at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d, __ A.D.2d __ (1st Dept.), appeal 
denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991). 
119  New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91. The court’s holding 
granted the city’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the Board of Elections from 
violating charter section 25(b)(7) by either giving reference to a City Council 
candidate’s party affiliation or giving recognition to the Democratic Party’s 
certificate of nomination on behalf of a candidate. Id. 
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and Borough President and changed the candidate nomination 
process.120 The case arose when the Board of Elections 
encountered a conflict between New York State Election Law 
Section 6-114, which provides that “[p]arty nominations for an 
office to be filled at a special election shall be made in the 
manner prescribed by the rules of the party,”121 and the voter-
approved City Charter Section 25(b)(7), which established a 
nonpartisan nominating process by providing for “nomination by 
[independent] petitions rather than nomination by party 
committee whenever nominations cannot be made by primary 
election.”122 
The 1988 Charter Revision Commission’s objective in 
changing special elections to a nonpartisan format was to “create 
a more open and democratic process for filling City Council 
vacancies so that Council members can be selected directly by the 
people they represent and potential candidates can have equal 
access to the ballot.”123 The new nominating process intended to 
replace one that gave political party leaders an overly powerful 
role in nominating candidates in special elections.124 To fulfill this 
objective of enhancing access to the ballot, the Commission 
emphasized implementing independent nominating petitions more 
                                                          
120 New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91. See also Cerisse 
Anderson, Party Designation Barred in Special Council Election, N.Y. L.J., 
Apr. 4, 1991, at 1. 
121 New York City Board of Elections, No. 41450/91 at 3; N.Y. ELEC. 
LAW § 6-114 (McKinney 2003). 
122 New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91 at 7 (quoting the 1988 
report of the New York City Charter Revision Commission) (citation omitted). 
See also Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional 
Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181 (2001). In 
recognizing that primary ballot access laws could undermine voters’ 
opportunity to cast a meaningful vote, Persily examined how the party primary 
structure, essentially determined by the two major political parties, could serve 
as a barrier to access to the general election ballot. Id. 
123 Pl.’s Reply Mem. of Law at 4, New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 
41450/91. 
124 Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 18-19, New 
York City Board of Elections, No. 41450/91. 
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than creating nonpartisan elections per se.125 
The court concluded that there was no conflict between the 
charter and the election law because the State Constitution 
conferred upon municipalities the power to establish their own 
local election law provisions.126 Thus, Section 25(b)(7) was 
upheld notwithstanding New York State Election Law Section 6-
114, which allows parties to place their candidates’ party labels 
on the ballot.127 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS 
Opponents of nonpartisan elections point to purported 
successes of the current partisan system for local elections and 
highlight concerns that a nonpartisan format might be detrimental 
to the city.128 Partisan advocates claim that parties provide a 
cohesive ideology, ensure accountability, inform voters, fund 
candidates and increase minority electoral influence.129 They 
express concern that a nonpartisan system would not only lead to 
a loss of these benefits, but also depress voter turnout, increase 
dependence on less informative voter cues and lead to an unfair 
Republican advantage.130 
Supporters of the current partisan election system argue that 
political parties should maintain their role in local elections 
because of their critical function in connecting people to the 
political system.131 Political parties, unlike narrowly-focused, 
                                                          
125 Hearing (Sept. 3, 2002), supra note 6 (statement of Howard Friedman, 
Senior Counsel, New York City Law Department, noting that the statutory 
provisions do not use the words “non-partisan election” to describe the special 
election but do refer to independent nominating petitions). 
126 New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 41450/91 at 3. 
127 Id. at 4. See Anderson, supra note 120. 
128 See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text (outlining the arguments 
of nonpartisan opponents). 
129 See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text (highlighting the 
benefits political parties bring to the electoral system). 
130 See infra notes 144-51 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns 
of partisan supporters with regard to the effects of nonpartisan election 
systems). 
131 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 82; see infra notes 132-44 
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single-issue organizations, play an important role in “assembling 
ideological coalitions” and uniting voters across a spectrum of 
issues based on a common policy perspective.132 To that extent, 
political parties are useful signals of candidates’ policy 
differences.133 Furthermore, party affiliation promotes 
accountability of the candidate to a party’s policy orientation, 
both as a candidate and as an elected official.134 
Political parties also assist voters and candidates by providing 
funding and distributing candidate information.135 A party’s 
multi-issue, policy-oriented structure makes it an efficient 
mechanism to disseminate a candidate’s viewpoint on a broad 
                                                          
and accompanying text. 
132 See Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election 
System: Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the 
New York City Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter 
Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002)] (statement of David Yassky, City Council member 
representing the 33rd District in Brooklyn, that “[p]arties can be organizers of 
ideology and constructors of agenda to which people adhere”). See also Press 
Release, Denny Farrell, supra note 67 (discussing the role political parties 
play in financially supporting candidates and in offering citizens a way to 
participate in public service). 
133 See Amy Bridges, Editorial, In Elections, Parties Matter, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A18 (discussing the benefits that political parties 
bring to elections). But see infra note 178 and accompanying text (noting the 
divergence of broad national political ideology from localized needs). 
134 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 70 (stating a nonpartisan 
opponent view that parties “force candidates to make commitments that result 
in political accountability”); Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (noting that the 
collective behavior and responsibility facilitated by political parties promotes 
candidate accountability). But see infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing how the 
context of New York’s current partisan system eliminates public official 
accountability). 
135 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 92 (summarizing Dr. Susan 
Welch’s support for political parties and the benefits they bring to the political 
system); Bridges, supra note 133 (noting the role parties play in distributing 
information); Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election 
System: Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the 
New York City Charter Revision Commission, (Aug. 21, 2002) [hereinafter 
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002)] (statement of Professor Clayton Gillette, Professor 
of Law, New York University School of Law, noting various benefits 
provided by parties). 
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range of issues,136 and information about a candidate’s position 
can only be effectively disseminated to voters if they obtain 
adequate funding.137 Partisan advocates argue that, under the 
partisan structure, parties support candidates by playing a 
significant role in funding their campaigns.138 Political parties’ 
financial support also helps candidates efficiently convey their 
platform through various media.139 In addition to funding 
candidates, political parties also “help recruit, train, and support 
candidates.”140 
Adherents of the current partisan process also cite the 
successes that minorities have made within the party structure, 
                                                          
136 See Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (describing the historical role of 
political parties as a “structured alliance” between a candidate and his 
supporters, who support his or her policy issues); Bridges, supra note 133 
(noting that political parties “are the only devices thus far invented which 
generate power on behalf of the many). 
137 Sherrill, supra note 105, at 18 (explaining that “candidates running 
without the advantage of . . . party identification will have to raise and spend 
much more money to achieve desired levels of name recognition”); CITY IN 
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-20 (acknowledging partisan advocates’ 
contention that nonpartisan elections will make it difficult for non-wealthy 
candidates to obtain sufficient campaign funds); David Seifman, Betsy: 
Nonparty Votes Help Rich, N.Y. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at 22 (noting Public 
Advocate Betsy Gotbaum’s view that Bloomberg’s implementation of 
nonpartisan elections will “only help wealthy candidates like himself”). 
138 See Sherrill, supra note 105, at 19 (arguing that without partisan 
elections, candidates will spend too much of their time in fundraising); 
Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Keith Wright, New 
York State assemblyman, 70th District). But see infra Part IV.C.3.c 
(discussing the New York City Campaign Finance Board’s unique efforts to 
financially support candidates and reduce wealth advantages in elections). 
139 Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Margaret 
Groarke, assistant professor of government, Manhattan College, discussing 
various ways that political parties contribute to electoral campaigns). But see 
infra Part IV.C.3.d (discussing the variety of electoral informational sources 
available to New York City voters). 
140 Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Margaret 
Groarke). But see infra notes 202-205 (discussing how the current system 
creates incentives for elected officials to be more responsive to their party’s 
national goals than to their constituents’ local interests). 
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particularly in becoming a solid voice in the Democratic Party.141 
Within the Democratic Party, blacks constitute thirty percent, 
Hispanics constitute twenty percent and Asians constitute three 
percent.142 In contrast, in the Republican Party blacks constitute 
six percent, Hispanics constitute four percent and Asians 
constitute twenty-nine percent.143 Opponents of nonpartisan 
elections fear that removing party labels from the ballot will 
amount to a setback to minorities in the development of their 
political clout.144 
Opponents of nonpartisan elections also fear that such a 
system would be detrimental to campaigns and the overall 
election process. They contend that the reduced role of the party 
and the subsequent loss of information typically distributed by 
political parties will make it more difficult for the average citizen 
                                                          
141 See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of 
Yvette Clark, City Council Member, 40th District in Brooklyn, that “[m]any 
of our communities are just coming of age with respect to the exercising of 
their voting rights”); Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of 
William (Bill) Perkins, City Council Member, 9th District in Manhattan, 
asserting that “[e]liminating the Democratic Party’s official role could have 
serious effects for Latino and African American voters who are a growing 
force within the party”). See also supra note 90 (delineating the percentage of 
minorities enrolled in the Democratic Party in New York City, based on 2001 
exit polls). 
142 Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman). 
143 Id. The increase in minority participation was largely a result of 
passage and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. Id. (stating that “urban 
politics have largely been transformed over the past several [decades], in part 
by the Voting Rights Act”). 
144 Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Yvette Clark, 
City Council Member, 40th District in Brooklyn, expressing her belief that the 
“proposal flies in the face of those of us at the grass roots of our communities 
who have labored to register extremely disenfranchised communities to 
become active participants in the political process and now stand to face the 
rolling back of many of those gains”); Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 
132 (statement of Oliver Koppel, City Council Member, 11th District in the 
Bronx, that “it will disadvantage minority voters to shift from a system that 
has allowed one minority to get elected and last year a minority representative 
to come very close to becoming the Democratic candidate for Mayor”). But 
see infra Part IV.C.3.b (discussing how the nonpartisan system will benefit 
minority voters). 
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to evaluate competing candidates.145 If political parties no longer 
retain their preferred status in local elections, their involvement 
may diminish, denying people informational benefits.146 The 
feared result is that the reduction in substantive information 
contributed by parties to campaigns will depress voter turnout.147 
Additionally, some people fear that nonpartisan elections 
would leave non-ideological factors like incumbency and name 
recognition as the primary cues for voter choice.148 Nonpartisan 
opponents contend that nonpartisan elections are less centered on 
ideology, and instead turn the electoral process into a 
“personality contest.”149 
Lastly, a key underlying concern is that nonpartisan elections 
will give Republicans an unfair advantage.150 The phenomenon 
                                                          
145 Sherrill, supra note 105, at 20 (stating that removing the party label 
will deprive voters “of the historical perspective needed to project the nature 
of an administration”); Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of 
Dorothy Siegel, a community activist from Brooklyn, that “without party 
affiliation voters will have no idea who they’re voting for or what candidates 
stand for”). 
146 See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that removing the party label 
from the ballot will discourage party involvement, consequently “placing 
greater demands on [voters’] ideology; cognitive capacity; experience; and 
nonparty sources of political communication and mobilization”). But see notes 
276-280 and accompanying text (discussing why political parties need not and, 
in fact, should not reduce their informal role in the political process). 
147 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that “[c]onflicting 
studies were cited concerning whether nonpartisan elections would increase 
voter turnout or minority participation”). But see supra Part I, notes 93-98 and 
accompanying text (discussing voter turnout). But see IV.C.3.a (discussing the 
inapplicability of lower voter turnout concerns). 
148 Schaffner et al., supra note 32, at 4 (describing alternative voter cues 
used when political parties are removed from the ballot); Margaret Groarke, 
Written Testimony Before The New York City Charter Revision Commission, 
Brooklyn (Aug. 13, 2002) (on file with author) (citing incumbency, name 
familiarity, ethnicity and gender as alternative voter cues). 
149 See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Virginia 
Fields, Borough President of Manhattan, that “by cloaking all candidates 
under a non-partisan blur, major ideological differences that exist between the 
parties are no longer apparent and the process becomes the personality 
contest”). 
150 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 77-99 (summarizing studies confirming the 
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was found in several studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s 
examining voting patterns in nonpartisan elections and was found 
to exist based on the disproportionate likelihood for Republican 
candidates to win, compared with the proportional number of 
Republican Party registrants in the respective regions.151 The 
rationale offered to explain this phenomenon is that Democrats, 
who are often members of lower socioeconomic classes, depend 
more on parties for information than Republicans.152 
The concerns raised are legitimate and should be taken into 
account in deciding whether to implement nonpartisan elections 
                                                          
Republican advantage in nonpartisan elections in California between the 1950s 
and 1960s). The Republican advantage is also described as a wealth 
advantage. See Edward L. Lascher, Jr., The Case of the Missing Democrats: 
Reexamining the “Republican Advantage” in Nonpartisan Elections, 44 W. 
POL. Q. 656, 657 (1991) (hypothesizing that Republicans’ likelihood of having 
greater financial means with which to increase name recognition and improve 
candidate image is a possible explanation for the Republican advantage). But 
see infra Part IV.C.3.e (discussing the inapplicability of the Republican 
advantage to New York City). 
151 See Lascher, supra note 150, at 663 (discussing Lascher’s study, 
which surveyed California county supervisors elected by nonpartisan elections, 
where county supervisor positions are functionally comparable to city council 
offices). The Republican advantage was found at all but very high levels of 
Democratic voter registration. Id.; HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing 
the implications of a study showing a partisan bias in nonpartisan elections for 
city council and mayoral positions in eighty-eight cities in California between 
1957 and 1966). Interestingly, arguments raising concerns of a “Republican 
advantage” were missing from hearing testimonies, but were prevalent in daily 
newspaper editorials. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, For City Charter 
Commission, First a Goal, Then the Members, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at 
D3 (suggesting that nonpartisan elections could benefit Mayor Bloomberg as a 
Republican in a city that is five-to-one Democratic); David Seifman, Bloomy 
Charter Vote Chills Pataki, N.Y. POST, July 27, 2002, at 2 (warning of a 
potential Republican advantage if New York implemented nonpartisan 
elections). Concerns of a wealth advantage were more commonly raised by 
public officials. See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement 
of Betsy Gotbaum, New York City Public Advocate, that “nonpartisan 
elections certainly favor wealthy candidates”). 
152 See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 63. But see infra Part IV.C.3.e 
(discussing why the Republican advantage would not apply in light of New 
York’s particular demographics and circumstances). 
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in any city. Such an evaluation, however, will be unique in every 
municipality, based on city-specific “problems, needs and 
resources” that may confirm or diminish the relevance of the 
various contentions.153 
IV. REINVIGORATING NEW YORK CITY’S LOCAL ELECTIONS 
Understanding the distinct rationale for nonpartisan elections 
at the local level requires examining the rationale of political 
party involvement in national and state electoral campaigns. 
Political parties play distinctly different roles at local levels and 
therefore warrant independent consideration. Nonpartisan 
elections do not dismiss ideology, public policy and political 
parties as irrelevant.154 To the contrary, studies have shown that 
political party organizations remained active in nonpartisan local 
elections in large cities.155 Moreover, nonpartisan elections bring 
competitiveness to local elections, empower all registered voters 
                                                          
153 See LEE, supra note 11, at 184. Lee explains that examination of these 
community-specific characteristics should be undertaken with the goal of 
answering the following questions: 
[W]hich system will do most to enhance the twin factors of 
competition and consensus essential to the democratic process[?] 
Which system will best promote freedom and equality of access to 
public office and political activity by all groups in the community? 
Which system will best encourage the presentation of alternative 
viewpoints on key issues facing the community and relate these views 
to candidate choice? And finally, which system will best lead to the 
recruitment and election of those men and women of ability and 
integrity without whom the community will fail to reach its potential 
as a vital force in the life of its citizens? 
Id. 
154 See Joseph Mercurio, Editorial, Non-Partisan Elections: Mayor’s First 
Misstep?, National Political Services, Inc., at http://www.nationalpolitical. 
com/column133.htm (August 2, 2002) [hereinafter Mercurio, Mayor’s 
Misstep?] (stating that, contrary to views that nonpartisan elections are 
intended to remove party activity in elections, “adopting non-partisan elections 
is not a plot to eliminate political parties”). 
155 See LEE, supra note 11, at 149 (stating that “[r]espondents from the 
larger cities more often reported that political party organizations were active 
in city elections”). 
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to determine the outcome of the election and create incentives for 
candidates to put local concerns at the forefront of their campaign 
platform and during their term of office. Of course, each 
municipality must make its own determination as to the value of a 
nonpartisan system by examining local factors such as the size 
and diversity of population, financial resources available to 
candidates, the vigor and variety of local news and informational 
sources and the competitiveness of the local party system.156 The 
particular characteristics of New York City, however, indicate 
that the time has come for the city to switch to nonpartisan 
elections.157 
A. The Roles of Political Parties 
Although political parties are not mentioned in the 
Constitution, the growth and survival of the two-party system 
throughout American history and the unique statutory roles of 
parties in the electoral process have made them the primary 
structure for collective action.158 Political parties facilitate three 
major electoral functions: participation, representation and 
competition.159 Because of their large constituencies, political 
                                                          
156 See Id. at 29-30. 
157 See infra Part IV.C for a full discussion on the characteristics of New 
York City that support the establishment of nonpartisan elections; see also, 
Lenora Fulani, Editorial, The Right Time, NEWSDAY, July 30, 2002, at A28 
(arguing that “when Democratic Party Professionals argue that more time is 
needed to study the issue, they mean that more time is needed to recapture 
control of the black vote, one-third of which escaped its grasp last year”); 
Michael Kramer, Editorial, Mike’s Voting Reform on the Money, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Aug. 7, 2002, at 14 (stating that Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal for 
nonpartisan elections is “long overdue”). 
158 See LEE, supra note 11, at 113 (arguing that “[e]ffective local 
government depends on organized political action by organized groups. Party 
organization may not be the best, but it is better than no organization”); see 
also Persily, supra note 122, at 2188 (describing the different functions that 
political parties play, which largely exist by virtue of their roles as “state 
actor-private association hybrids”); supra Part I.A.1 (describing the historical 
need to define political parties statutorily, in order to give them official roles 
in state and local elections). 
159 See Persily, supra note 122, at 2188 (outlining the various functions of 
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parties can organize individuals to take collective action at a 
“massive scale.”160 They also have the unique opportunity to 
enhance participation through party primaries,161 which provide 
voters the opportunity to select candidates that they believe will 
best represent the party and execute the goals of the party’s 
platform.162 Partisan election systems, in which political parties 
are granted preferred organizational status, are also beneficial as 
formalized mechanisms for generating competition, one of the 
vital forces behind a thriving democracy.163 One political 
sociologist explained the coexistence of competition and 
cohesion, stating that “[a] stable democratic system requires 
sources of cleavage so that there will be struggle over ruling 
positions, challenges to parties in power, and shifts of parties in 
office; but without consensus—a system allowing a peaceful 
‘play’ of power—there can be no democracy.”164 Parties not in 
                                                          
party primaries). 
160 See id.; Sherill, supra note 136, at 16 (noting that political parties 
facilitate collective behavior). 
161 Persily, supra note 122, at 2189. 
162 Id. at 2189; see also Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 
(statement of Margaret Groarke, an assistant professor of government at 
Manhattan College, that party candidates will “carry out their program if 
elected”). 
163 LEE, supra note 11, at 161. In fact, successful partisan elections are 
largely premised on the existence of a competitive two-party system. Charter 
Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local Election System: Hearing on 
Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 Before the New York City Charter 
Revision Commission (Aug. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002)] 
(statement of Richard Flanagan, a professor of political science with Staten 
Island College). The very rise of political parties in the United States in the 
nineteenth century raised voter participation levels to extremely high levels. 
Id. Joseph Mercurio, Non-partisan Municipal Elections – An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come, National Political Services, Inc., at http://www.nationalpolitical. 
com/column121.htm (May 16, 2002) [hereinafter Mercurio, Time Has Come] 
(stating that contested elections encourage “responsive government”). 
164 LEE, supra note 11, at 157 (quoting political sociologist Seymour 
Martin Lipset) (citation omitted). Interestingly, partisan advocates often 
emphasize the importance of parties in creating cohesion but fail to mention its 
critical counterpart role of generating competition when advocating for 
partisan elections in an uncompetitive city. See Sherrill, supra note 105, at 18 
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power can fuel “political innovation” and seek “to implement 
relatively major changes in efforts to attract large segments of the 
electorate to its support.”165 In a partisan election system, parties 
create competition by establishing frequent and consistent 
channels to air and oppose viewpoints.166 
Nevertheless, “[t]hat meaningful competition and opposition 
are more plentiful under a partisan system has not yet been 
established, . . . and any such generalization must be seriously 
qualified by the existence of many cities in which one party has a 
preponderant majority and cannot be effectively challenged.”167 
As even one political scientist opposed to nonpartisan elections 
recognized, partisan election systems are “less likely to be 
responsive to needs for social change” in the absence of inter-
party competition. 168 
Today’s national political party committees establish annual 
party platforms to articulate their broad policy directions.169 Even 
as they attempt to create a cohesive objective, however, one of 
the most difficult problems for parties at the national level is 
“building and maintaining electoral coalitions,” due to the need 
to unite communities with very different social, economic and 
political concerns.170 “Uniting diverse and sometimes latently 
antagonistic population subgroups into a single and successful 
voting coalition has required subordinating inter-group tensions 
                                                          
(noting, in his article opposing nonpartisan elections in New York City, that 
parties encourage cohesiveness in politics). 
165 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 164. 
166 LEE, supra note 11, at 161. See Persily, supra note 122, at 2190 
(explaining that “regulation of the [party] primary can determine the 
probability for turnover in government, the number of candidates actively 
pursuing voter support, and the chance that challenges to incumbents will arise 
at some point of the electoral process”). 
167 LEE, supra note 11, at 161. 
168 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 164. 
169 See The Democratic National Committee, 2000 Democratic National 
Platform, http://www.democrats.org/about/platform.html; The Republican 
National Committee, Republican Platform 2000, http://www.rnc.org/gopinfo/ 
platform (last visited Apr. 24, 2002). 
170 See PAUL KLEPPNER, Critical Realignments and Electoral Systems, in 
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 4 (1981). 
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to party objectives.”171 In fact, holding a broadly cohesive 
platform together often “exclude[s] any sustained concern by 
parties for policy articulation.”172 
B. The Nonpartisan Format is Useful and Legitimate at the 
Local Level 
The reality of the looser national and state units contrasts 
starkly with the ability of candidates to articulate specific 
community commitments at the local level. Local candidates, by 
virtue of the geographically “local” nature of the community and 
its more unified interests, can engage directly with the 
community, listen to their constituency and articulate their 
responsive commitments, rather than relying on party affiliation 
as a primary vehicle to espouse political ideology.173 This distinct 
opportunity, compared with those running for state or national 
offices, undermines the argument that political party preferential 
status is a prerequisite to informed participation.174 
Some argue that local governance is distinct from federal 
governance inasmuch as it tends to be more managerial and 
provision-oriented than party politics-oriented.175 Cities deal with 
                                                          
171 Id. 
172 Id. Political parties’ priority to amass the support of large numbers of 
constituents consequently forces them to “couch their platform planks in vague 
generalities.” JEWELL CASS PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 216 (1960). 
173 See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Michelle 
Bouchard, a former city council candidate for the third district in Manhattan, 
stating her view that partisan politics at the local level creates dividing lines 
and ideological war, and because important issues are not partisan, they should 
not be “claimed by either party”); Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 
(statement of Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood expressing her belief, based on her 
mayoral experience, that more important than party politics is the importance 
of responsiveness of local officials to neighborhood residents’ concerns). 
174 See supra Part III (citing arguments by partisan proponents of the 
importance of political party activity in distributing candidate information and 
encouraging voter participation). 
175 Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Professor 
Clayton Gillette, a law professor with New York University School of Law). 
CHANGMACROX.DOC 7/7/03 11:22 AM 
 NONPARTISAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN NYC 615 
resource redistribution at a much more local and regional scope, 
compared with higher federal offices.176 The problems local 
officials address include low-income housing, urban 
redevelopment, local crime, social welfare services, 
environmental control and land use planning.177 Although the 
state and national governments deal with similar problems on a 
larger scale, the policy objectives that a national party seeks to 
achieve, by virtue of the broader jurisdiction they seek to 
encompass, often diverge from the specific needs to which a local 
official must respond.178 
Studies have shown that, as the population of a city increases, 
the likelihood of a local government official running for state and 
federal government offices increases.179 Larger population also 
enhances the likelihood of a party attempting to “groom” local 
leaders for higher office, and in doing so, would implicate the 
higher state or national policy agenda, rather than the interests of 
a particular district.180 The danger of compromised local 
                                                          
See also Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Orlando Mayor 
Glenda Hood explaining that in her experience as Mayor of Orlando, the 
issues she has encountered are only minimally related to partisan politics). 
176 Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Professor 
Clayton Gillette). 
177 See HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 182. 
178 Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Professor 
Clayton Gillette contrasting local and national “economic and political 
environment” and the significant differences in objectives sought in resource 
distribution and development of the respective local versus national economy). 
179 See LEE, supra note 11, at 107 tbl.38 (California “Cities Reporting 
Local Officials Having Run for State or National Office”). 
180 See id. at 106 (discussing the results of a survey of party chairmen 
throughout the state of California, asking the chairmen, “Have you or your 
predecessor in the past four years looked to the ranks of city, county, or 
school officeholders to seek candidates for state or national office?”). The 
survey results indicated that “42 per cent of the chairmen in counties under 
50,000 and 62 per cent of those from the larger counties replied they had often 
or sometimes looked to the local ranks.” Id. See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), 
supra note 135 (statement of Professor Clayton Gillette explaining the 
possibility that when political parties select candidates with the intention of 
promoting them to state or national offices, the candidate’s agenda, by virtue 
of his obedience to the party’s agenda, may not be aligned with those of 
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commitment is evident when juxtaposing the dichotomous 
agendas of local governance and national policy objectives with 
the desire of the national party to begin preparing local officials 
for higher offices.181 
Despite the differences in local versus state and national 
campaigning and governance, voters should take candidates’ 
policy preferences seriously when assessing a municipal 
candidate. Studies have shown correlations between a municipal 
candidate’s party affiliation and their actions once elected.182 The 
correlation is found primarily when examining an elected 
official’s willingness to use governmental power actively to solve 
problems—Democrats are generally more willing to use 
governmental power while Republicans generally seek more 
limited government involvement.183 The belief that candidates 
affiliated with a certain party publicly uphold certain policy 
attitudes, indeed, underlies the fundamental importance of 
partisanship.184 The claim that there is “no Republican or 
Democratic way to pave a street” fails to acknowledge that policy 
attitudes are found in the details of the project.185 
Nonpartisan elections are not geared towards hiding candidate 
policy leanings, but seek to make local elections more accessible 
and competitive, as seen in the rationales that underlie New York 
City’s nonpartisan special elections. Moreover, officials, once 
elected, remain aware of the party affiliations and policy 
perspectives of fellow elected officials and are thus able to form 
                                                          
importance to the city economy). 
181 See id. 
182 HAWLEY, supra note 11, at 118-19. 
183 See id. 
184 Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (stating that people rationally “associate 
political parties with competing philosophies of government”). 
185 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 111; Josh Shipper, The Party’s Not Over, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE, Aug. 15, 2001 (stating that the premise for nonpartisan 
systems is based on the idea that “[y]ou don’t need to be Republican or 
Democrat to pave a road”), available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/ 
searchlight2001/archives/arch.feature.html. In reality, there are important 
policy issues not found in the technical details of paving the street, but in 
deciding which streets in which neighborhood to pave, or which streets to give 
maintenance priority. HAWLEY, supra. 
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alliances when the need arises.186 
C. Nonpartisan Elections Will Reinvigorate the Vote in New 
York City 
The partisan electoral system in New York City has failed to 
inspire competition and accountability, and allows election of 
public officials by the few rather than by the many. Nonpartisan 
elections would reinvigorate the campaign process by opening 
primary access to voters and candidates, bringing back the 
meaningfulness of voting in a competitive general election, 
promoting a broader examination of candidate merits and perhaps 
encouraging a more informed vote. 
1. New York’s Current Local Election System 
Harms All Its Voters 
With Democrats comprising more than sixty-five percent of 
all registered voters in the city, and about eighty percent of all 
registered party members, New York City is effectively a single-
party system.187 In New York City, 4,237,103 people are 
currently registered to vote.188 Of that number, 2,819,414 are 
enrolled as Democrats.189 Yet, only 785,365 Democrats, less than 
one-third of all Democrats, voted in the 2001 mayoral primary, 
with even lower numbers voting for their city council 
members.190 Among minority voters, these numbers are 
                                                          
186 Hearing, supra note 90 (statement of Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood). 
187 New York State Board of Elections, Enrollment Statistics in November 
2002, http://www.elections.state.ny.us/enrollment/enroll.htm (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Enrollment Statistics]. See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s 
Campaign Promise, supra note 10 (citing similar party enrollment statistics in 
New York City in 2001). See also Persily, supra note 122, at 2224 (noting 
that political parties have a legitimate interest in creating restrictive primary 
ballot access laws to produce a candidate with enough party support to be 
competitive in the general election). 
188 Enrollment Statistics, supra note 187. 
189 Id. 
190 Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryElection/ (Oct. 11, 2001). See 
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proportionally lower.191 
At the same time, over 880,000 voters, approximately twenty 
percent of the electorate, are affiliated with neither the 
Republican nor Democratic Party.192 These numbers indicate that 
the current primary system allows the narrow population of party 
primary voters to determine the candidates that participate in the 
runoff election.193 In almost all municipal offices, the Democratic 
Party primary winner claimed victory in a virtually uncontested 
general election.194 Thus, with the race practically concluded 
                                                          
Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10 (citing similar 
statistics). As an example of the differential in voter participation between 
citywide and district council elections, in the 2001 primary, in the 1st District 
of Manhattan, 51,799 voters participated in the mayoral Democratic primary, 
while only 15,483, less then one-third, voted in the Democratic councilmanic 
primary. Id. 
191 See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10. 
192 Enrollment Statistics, supra note 187. 
193 Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Louisa Chan, a 
member of the community school board in district 24 that the city’s primary 
system gives a small group of special interest groups control of the entire 
election). See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 88 (summarizing 
comments by nonpartisan supporters that candidates will be forced to address 
issues facing the entire population and not merely those issues voiced by the 
“narrow group of insiders who tend to vote in partisan primaries”). 
194 Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection/ (Nov. 28, 2001). For 
example, in the election for Public Advocate, the Democratic candidate won 
with 845,924 votes, with the closest runner-up receiving only 56,647 votes, a 
difference of 789,277 votes. Id. Similarly, the Democratic candidate won the 
seat for Comptroller with 768,700 votes, the runner-up receiving 705,357 
votes less. Id. In the eighth council district in the Bronx, the Democratic 
candidate won in the general election with 16,678 votes, while the runner-up 
candidate only received 2,342 votes. Board of Elections in the City of New 
York, Election Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection 
(Nov. 28, 2001). In the twenty-second council district in Queens, the 
Democratic candidate won with 11,354 votes, while the runner-up received 
only 6,133 votes. Id. The mayoral election is arguably an exception, as 
evidenced by the election of two Republican mayors during the last decade. 
See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of former New York 
City Mayor Koch); Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of 
Professor Richard Flanagan that “only six or perhaps seven Council seats, and 
I’m being generous here, and the Mayor’s office are competitive in the general 
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during the primary in favor of the dominant party and the 
candidate selected by this narrow subgroup of dominant party 
primary voters, unaffiliated voters and members of other parties 
are effectively disenfranchised.195 
The ills of our current system afflict all voters, Democrats 
included. Supporters of the partisan system encourage voters to 
use a candidate’s party affiliation as a proxy for evaluating a 
candidate’s policy positions.196 Political scientists particularly 
emphasize that voting purely based on party affiliation is a 
rational decision made by voters.197 The typical rebuttal is that 
insisting on party labels on the ballot sends a message that voters 
cannot vote intelligently without the party cue.198 But, as the 
                                                          
election”). Mayor Bloomberg won the 2001 general election with 685,666 
votes, only 35,489 votes more than Democratic candidate Mark Green. Board 
of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results, http://vote.nyc.ny. 
us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection (Nov. 28, 2001). That the mayoral seat is 
actually competitive, however, is arguable because in fact, only four 
Republican mayors have been elected in the last century. See Shipper, supra 
note 185 (quoting former Mayor Giuliani, who stated that he was “only the 
third Republican mayor in 100 years”). See also Mercurio, Time Has Come, 
supra note 163 (explaining the uncontested nature of the majority of the city’s 
elections). 
195 See Persily, supra note 122, at 2215-16 (explaining that the 
meaningfulness of the vote “derives from its power to determine winners and 
losers of elections,” which forms a purpose distinct from those of “voting 
booth expression and association” that are fulfilled when voters exercise their 
right to vote). 
196 Sherrill, supra note 105, at 17 (explaining that voting based on party 
affiliation is rational because parties are associated with “competing 
philosophies of government”). 
197 See, e.g., id.; Schaffner et al., supra note 32, at 2 (stating that 
political scientists are “informed by rational actor theories of behavior” and 
believe that while “many citizens are going to be poorly informed about, and 
only moderately interested in politics, . . . they are able to achieve a 
‘collective rationality’ through ‘information short cuts’ such as party labels”). 
“Party labels, in this perspective, provide important cognitive information. 
They convey generally accurate policy information about candidates and their 
low cost and accessibility help voters to reach reasonable decisions.” Id. 
198 See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement by 
Peter Holoman; Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement by Dr. 
Jessie Fields, a former Republican and Independence Party candidate for the 
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Supreme Court stated: 
To the extent that party labels provide a shorthand 
designation of the views of party candidates on matters of 
public concern, the identification of candidates with 
particular parties plays a role in the process by which 
voters inform themselves for the exercise of the franchise. 
Appellant’s argument depends upon the belief that voters 
can be “misled” by party labels. But “[o]ur cases reflect a 
greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform 
themselves about campaign issues.199 
 Party labels are not an inherently wrong way to inform voters 
of a candidate’s party affiliation. But, the lack of competition 
within a single party system combined with the statutory 
preference given to a candidate’s party affiliation create a 
disincentive for candidates to address the concerns of their 
constituency, since the victory will be won as long as they have 
the appropriate party label on the ballot and have made it past the 
primary.200 The possibility for patronage and corruption also 
increases when a single party dominates and has no viable 
                                                          
United States Congress). 
199 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 220 
(1986). In Tashjian, the State Republican Party Committee brought a federal 
action challenging the constitutionality of Connecticut’s closed primary law, 
which restricted party primary voting such that only party members could vote 
in the party primary. Id. at 211. The Court found that the law impermissibly 
interfered with the political party’s First Amendment right to define its 
associational boundaries. Id. at 225. 
200 See Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2001). In his symposium presentation 
examining the role of political parties in judicial elections, Champagne, while 
recognizing that party labels provide “a clue” into the attitudes and values of 
judges, also noted that a highly qualified judicial candidate could also be 
harmed by bearing the wrong party label. Id. Champagne highlighted, as an 
example, the judicial elections in Houston, Tex., where Republican straight 
ticket voting led to the defeat of nineteen Democratic judges in Harris County 
and cited a comment from a law school dean that “if Bozo the Clown had been 
running as a Republican against any Democrat, he would have had a chance.” 
Id. 
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competition in the general election.201 
Moreover, the noncompetitive system creates an incentive for 
victorious candidates to remain more loyal to the party that 
secured the victory than to their constituency, especially when a 
potential future in politics at higher state or national offices may 
rest in the hands of the party hierarchy.202 Officials whose 
loyalties lie primarily with the party hierarchy will be less 
responsive to the public in situations where unified local needs 
and preferences diverge from state and national policy 
objectives.203 
The importance of garnering the party hierarchy’s support 
also presents an obstacle for candidates who may have good ideas 
to improve their community but whose views and interests may 
not conform to the party line.204 The harm of the party label 
derives less from its presence on the ballot on election day than 
from the perpetuation of a process controlled by party hierarchy 
entrenched in the partisan local election structure.205 
The party-controlled process may have deeper implications 
upon the minority community, most of which are Democrats.206 
The Democratic Party includes many of the most zealous 
nonpartisan election opponents, who often argue that minorities 
will be harmed under a nonpartisan system and benefit under the 
                                                          
201 See Northup, supra note 28, at 1681. 
202 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 84. See also Hearing (Aug. 
13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Rabbi Lieb Blantz of Brooklyn). 
203 See supra Part IV.A regarding the importance of competitive elections 
in ensuring responsive government. 
204 See Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of Michelle 
Bouchard, former candidate for city council from Manhattan). See also 
Shipper, supra note 185 (describing how a team of a dozen lawyers working 
for the Queens County Democratic Organization worked to disqualify one-
third of the city council candidates in one Queens County district for technical 
errors in their ballot petition signatures). 
205 See Persily, supra note 122 (examining the problem of the party-
controlled process, in the context of party-constructed primary ballot access 
laws). Persily particularly highlighted how primary ballot access laws have 
been used to guarantee “that only the party establishment’s favored nominee 
could get on the ballot.” See id. at 2206. 
206 See infra notes 207-211 and accompanying text. 
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current partisan system.207 At the local level, city council 
elections are determined by racial demographics, not by 
partisanship.208 Harry Kresky, co-chair of the Rules Committee 
of the Independence Party of New York, argued that structural 
racism within political parties exists not in the city council races, 
but in the city statewide races.209 By examining the failure of 
various minority candidates to win the Democratic ticket, Kresky 
posited that the Democratic Party, rather than empowering blacks 
and Latinos, “ensures their status as the most loyal constituencies 
whose votes are vitally needed to elect white Democrats to 
citywide, statewide and national office.”210 He suggested that 
minorities would be more empowered if they acted as a 
nonpartisan swing vote, ensuring the election of the best 
candidate, regardless of race or party.211 
The current partisan election process deprives voters of a 
meaningful vote in the election by restricting access where the 
final decision is effectively determined, weakens public official 
accountability and creates an election system that allows the party 
hierarchy to exert too much control.212 Only when New York 
                                                          
207 Supra Part III (stating partisan proponents’ belief that the partisan 
system benefits minority voters). 
208 Harry Kresky, Editorial, Green Shows the Democrats’ One True 
Color, NEWSDAY, Oct. 25, 2001, at A47 (contending that structural racism 
exists within the Democratic Party). 
209 Id. See also Charter Revisions to Establish a Nonpartisan Local 
Election System: Hearing on Proposed New York City Charter Chapter 3 
Before the New York City Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 6, 2002) 
[hereinafter Hearing (Aug. 6, 2002)] (statements of Harry Kresky, Charter 
Revision Commissioner, and Dr. Lichtman, a professor of history with 
American University, discussing the hypothesis that due to the effect of 
demographics in determining many majority-minority district city council 
races, the change to nonpartisan elections would have a marginal effect on the 
results of those races). 
210 Kresky, supra note 208 (noting the lack of success of minority 
Democratic candidates in citywide elections, and pointing out the racist tactics 
used by Democratic mayoral candidate Mark Green in his 2001 primary 
campaign against Hispanic Democratic candidate Herman Badillo). 
211 Id. 
212 See supra notes 193-211 and accompanying text (describing how the 
current restrictive system deincentivizes official accountability while 
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City returns the decision-making power to the broader population 
of registered voters will it achieve a genuinely representative 
democracy and responsive government. 
2. Nonpartisan Elections Will Increase Electoral 
Access and Competition 
Responsive governments exist when voters determine the 
results in contested elections.213 In contrast to the accepted, 
expected role of political parties in engendering electoral 
competition, the single party system divests parties of any 
incentive to use their preferred status to create the competition 
necessary to safeguard voters’ choices.214 New York’s municipal 
elections are anything but competitive, and this creates 
accountability problems.215 The majority of winners in the city’s 
local elections face no significant competition in the general 
elections, and the critical decisions that determine the election 
results are made by a narrow subset of majority party members, 
cued by the party hierarchy.216 Often, less than five percent of 
                                                          
effectively increasing party influence). 
213 See Mercurio, Time Has Come, supra note 163 (stating that “when 
voters have a say in the outcome of elections and there are genuinely contested 
elections, the government is more responsive and less corrupt”); see also 
William Grady, In a GOP County, 2nd Party Would Be Nice; Poll Shows 
Democrat Competition Favored, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1997, at 1 (noting that 
even a local official supported by the dominant party in a one party city 
favored competitive elections). “The thing that keeps us all honest 
philosophically is when you know there’s somebody out there who wants to 
take you out. That’s the inherent beauty of the democratic system.” Id. 
214 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the roles of political parties in 
electoral campaigns). 
215 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E-7 (summarizing Cooper Union 
Professor Fred Siegal’s reasons for making all of the city’s elections 
nonpartisan). Professor Siegal noted that “[t]he present system is a political 
monopoly which eliminates competition and accountability.” Id. See supra 
note 194 (delineating statistics from New York City 2001 elections showing 
large voting differentials between winning candidates and runners-up). 
216 For example, while Public Advocate Betsy Gotbaum won the 2001 
general election by a difference of 789,277 votes, her competition was much 
narrower in the primary. See Board of Elections in the City of New York, 
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Democratic Party members—those who voted in the primary for 
the eventual winner—make the determination because partisan 
elections encourage straight ticket voting.217 Some voters may 
choose not to participate in elections in which their candidate of 
choice has virtually no chance of winning.218 Others are 
proscribed from meaningful participation due to restrictive ballot 
access laws such as the party primary.219 In the case of New York 
City’s electoral system, these conditions perpetuate the retention 
of control in the hands of the few.220 Nonpartisan elections would 
open up access at both the candidate selection and voting phases 
of the electoral process and put the election into the broader 
                                                          
Election Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection (Nov. 
28, 2001). Gotbaum won the primary with 156,832 votes, but the four closest 
runners-up received 105,985; 102,338; 101,424; and 99,914 votes, 
respectively. See Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election 
Results, http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryElection (Oct. 11, 
2001). Similarly, while Comptroller William C. Thompson won the 2001 
general election with a 705,357 vote lead over his runner-up candidate, his 
margin in the Democratic primary was much narrower, receiving 309,032 
votes compared to his runner-up, who received 261,637 votes. Compare 
Board of Elections in the City of New York, Election Results, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/generalElection (Nov. 28, 2001) with 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/pdf/results/2001/primaryElection (Oct. 11, 2001). See 
supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the uncontested nature of New York City local 
elections). 
217 See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10 
(arguing that under our current partisan system, “a tiny portion of [eligible 
voters] . . . chose the winner”); Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of 
“Informed Voter” Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (1999) 
(observing that “parties have worked to convince states to adopt the party-
column ballot, which encourages straight ticket voting”). 
218 See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1 (noting statistics that show that white 
voters do not participate in the election of district city council members in 
majority-minority districts and vice versa). 
219 See Persily, supra note 119, at 2189 (stating how party primaries 
“exist as a major avenue for political participation [in a] system [that] provides 
few opportunities for the average citizen to play a role in the workings of the 
democracy”). 
220 See Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10 
(discussing how few voters actually participate in the primary, the effective 
election). 
CHANGMACROX.DOC 7/7/03 11:22 AM 
 NONPARTISAN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN NYC 625 
public’s control. 
a. Broader Public Access in Candidate Selection 
Increasing public control over the results of the election is 
fundamental to a direct democracy.221 Nonpartisan elections allow 
all voters to cast a ballot at the primary stage.222 Just as the 
Voting Rights Act was enacted to give racial minorities greater 
access to the electoral decision-making process, nonpartisan 
elections give all voters, regardless of party affiliation, equal 
access to candidate selection.223 
When access to the primary is widened, the voices and votes 
of nonmajority party members and nonparty voters become a 
factor in nonpartisan elections.224 In elections with genuine 
                                                          
221 See PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 12 (noting nonpartisan 
supporters’ desire for a more direct democracy); Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), 
supra note 163 (statement of Jonathan Sassi, a professor of history with 
College of Staten Island, reviewing the history of American politics, which 
has moved from a more “elitist or deference kind of politics” in the Federalist 
days to a more participatory model in the “post-Jeffersonian world”). 
Ironically, partisan advocates contend that nonpartisan elections will strip 
away the direct democracy that arrived with partisan primaries. See Hearing 
(Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 (statement of State Assemblyman Herman 
Denny Farrell, New York State Democratic Committee State Chair, warning 
that “the proposal to have nonpartisan elections for New York officers may 
have the unintended effects for eliminating one of the greatest populus 
advances of the earliest 20th century, the nomination of party candidates for 
public office by direct primary elections adopted in New York in 1911”). 
222 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102 (setting forth section 
sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). Some cities, 
however, including Washington, D.C.; Portland, Or.; and Indianapolis, Ind., 
do not hold a primary. See PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at app. B. 
223 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2003) (stating that “a violation of [the 
Voting Rights Act] . . . is established if . . . it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected [under this 
statute] . . .”). See supra Part II.B (discussing the purpose of the Voting 
Rights Act). 
224 Mercurio, Mayor’s Misstep?, supra note 154. See also Lenora Fulani, 
Editorial, The Right Time, NEWSDAY, July 30, 2002, at A28 (noting that the 
African American community is increasingly independent minded rather than 
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competition, all voters, whether members of the majority party or 
not, can have a stake in the elections.225 In noncompetitive 
partisan elections, however, this segment of the voting population 
is virtually excluded.226 The merits assessed in 1988, when voters 
approved special nonpartisan elections, should be considered, and 
voters in New York City, including minorities, should recognize 
that change would enhance their ability to make their vote 
count.227 
The new system would give potential candidates equal access 
to the ballot, just as they already do in the city’s nonpartisan 
special elections.228 The same problems that the nonpartisan 
format change intended to resolve in 1988 are at issue—candidate 
access to the ballot and voter access to the candidate selection 
process.229 In single party jurisdictions where the primary is the 
“dispositive election,” primary ballot access rules can be the sole 
determinant of whether voters will have a chance to choose 
among candidates or whether the rule-makers, i.e., the parties, 
                                                          
being Democratic Party loyalists, as has historically been the case). 
225 Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10 (explaining 
how one-third of all voters, which are not part of the dominant party, have no 
real opportunity to vote meaningfully). See Enrollment Statistics, supra note 
187 (showing that, as of November, 2001, 1,417,689 of the 4,237,103 
registered voters, about one-third, are not members of the Democratic Party in 
New York City). 
226 See, e.g., Fornek, supra note 33 (describing the minority Republican 
Party’s mayoral primary as “little more than a political ‘Gong Show’ because 
of the virtual impossibility of a Republican candidate winning in the general 
election). 
227 See infra notes 228-230 and accompanying text (describing the 
relationship between the purposes of establishing nonpartisan special elections 
and those of establishing general nonpartisan municipal elections). 
228 See City of New York v. New York City Bd. of Elections, No. 
41450/91, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991), aff’d, __ A.D.2d __ (1st Dept.), 
appeal denied, 572 N.E.2d 50 (Mem.) (Apr. 10, 1991) (stating that “the 
charter [establishing special nonpartisan elections] would tend to widen rather 
than restrict the political process”). See also Part I.A.2 (discussing the motives 
behind the establishment of nonpartisan special elections). 
229 See PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the 
potential to increase opportunities for candidates whose views “may not fit 
with the party machines”). 
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will make that choice for them.230 Open access to the primary 
may be the most beneficial change because whereas support for 
nonpartisan elections based on “provisional versus political” 
distinctions,231 or expectations that nonpartisan elections eliminate 
party influence,232 cannot be guaranteed, increasing ballot access 
is an objective that is guaranteed, because allowing all voters to 
participate in the primary is a structural change that widens voter 
access at a crucial electoral juncture.233 
b. Broader Candidate Access to the Ballot 
Removing political parties’ favored status in the election 
structure increases opportunities for candidates whose views may 
not be synchronized with the party line, but whose ideas may be 
equally, if not more, beneficial to the community.234 If New York 
implements nonpartisan elections, local representatives would 
have greater freedom to serve the specific needs within their 
community, particularly on issues where a conflict of interest 
                                                          
230 Persily, supra note 122, at 2190 (discussing the potential negative 
effects of constructing restrictive ballot access laws). 
231 See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Orlando 
Mayor Glenda Hood supporting the idea of local governance as more 
provision-oriented than politics-oriented). Mayor Hood, however, also stated 
that the policy preferences and party affiliations of elected officials are still 
recognized informally and have been useful in forming alliances when the 
need arises. Id. 
232 Costikyan, supra note 40 (explaining that a Task Force charged with 
reviewing New York City government decided not to implement nonpartisan 
elections because their examination of such elections in other large cities 
showed that they did not eliminate the party from the election process). 
233 The 2002 Draft Charter aptly provides that all qualified voters are 
qualified to vote in the primary. See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102 
(providing section sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). 
234 PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 26 n.24 (stating that 
“nonpartisan systems give qualified candidates of the minority party or 
independents a better chance to succeed . . . [and] permit voters to analyze 
local issues independently on their merits and to focus on the intelligence and 
experience of the candidates themselves rather than on their political 
affiliations”). 
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exists with broader state or national party objectives.235 By 
facilitating broader candidate access to the ballot at the municipal 
election level, nonpartisan elections also encourage their 
localized commitment.236 
3. New York City Demographics Facilitate Nonpartisan Elections 
Additional factors specific to New York City both allay 
concerns of those wary of nonpartisan elections and support such 
a change. Specifically, the political and social conditions in the 
city will allow nonpartisan elections to offer fair minority 
representation, adequate candidate funding and sufficient 
candidate information without fear of a Republican advantage. 
a. Lower Voter Turnout: A Misplaced Fear 
Some studies suggest that nonpartisan elections reduce voter 
turnout.237 This projected consequence has raised repeated 
concerns that weigh against changing to nonpartisan elections.238 
These concerns, however, do not consider the particular local 
variables contributing to differential turnout.239 Although these 
                                                          
235 See supra note 180 (discussing the risk of compromised commitments 
by candidates). 
236 See supra Part IV.C.1 (describing how the current partisan system 
creates incentive for candidates to remain loyal to the party hierarchy above 
their constituency, which can create conflicts of interest when the state and 
national party objectives diverge from localized interests). 
237 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 136-38 (generally finding lower voter 
turnout from elections in six cities in California in 1955, compared with 
turnout at the 1954 general election); Schaffner et al., supra note 32, at 8 
(finding lower voter turnout in the mayoral elections in Urbana in 1985 and 
Champaign in 1987 than in the turnout in each city for the 1986 Illinois 
general election for the U.S. House of Representatives). 
238 See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 105, at 16; Margaret Groarke, Written 
Testimony Before The NYC Charter Revision Commission, Brooklyn (Aug. 
13, 2002) (on file with author). 
239 See Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor 
Frank Barry, a researcher with New York University Taub Urban Research 
Center and a former staff member with New York City’s Campaign Finance 
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concerns may be legitimate, they are largely inapplicable in New 
York. 
First, low voter turnout is evident in municipal elections 
across the country, regardless of whether the system is partisan 
or nonpartisan.240 Low turnout, moreover, occurs in local 
elections that are not held simultaneously with the election of 
officials to state and national offices, in which higher profile 
campaigns tend to draw a larger voter turnout.241 
Second, conclusions from studies done in the mid-twentieth 
century may not be applicable today in light of changing urban 
conditions in the last few decades, particularly driven by the 
enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.242 Moreover, findings 
in other studies have differed, and variances existed even within 
studies, which attenuate the applicability and validity of the 
sweeping conclusion that nonpartisan elections reduce voter 
turnout.243 
Third, reduced voter turnout is unlikely to occur in New 
York because of variables unique to the city, including 
population and competitiveness of the elections.244 Studies have 
shown that larger cities tend to exhibit more political activity.245 
                                                          
Board, noting that studies showing lower voter turnout did not control for 
various demographic factors). 
240 CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-13 (summarizing Dr. 
Lichtman’s testimony at the August 15, 2002 public hearing). 
241 Id. at 91. 
242 See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002) supra note 90 (statement of Dr. 
Lichtman that the Voting Rights Act “dramatically increased participation and 
involvement of minorities in the political process”); Voting Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1973 (2003) (federally criminalizing the use of any voting standards, 
practices or procedures that abridged the right to vote on account of color). 
243 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 138 (finding “variations in turnout in 
local races during a 25-year period” in three cities in California and noting 
that variables such as “the absence of competition, or the irregular intensity of 
some civic issue” may explain the fluctuations); Schaffner et al., supra note 
32, at 8 (finding that while their reduced turnout hypothesis held for Urbana 
and Champaign, it did not hold in Asheville). 
244 Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor 
Frank Barry). 
245 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 117. For example, Los Angeles and 
Chicago both administer nonpartisan elections, yet, parties have remained 
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Similarly, in light of the role of political parties as a major 
generator of electoral competition, political parties are more 
closely tied to competitive elections and less competitive elections 
might justify the use of nonpartisan elections.246 
New York City is the largest city in the nation, with a 
population of more than eight million, in contrast to the much 
smaller cities that showed lower voter turnout.247 The majority of 
cities examined in those studies also had competitive elections,248 
while many of New York City’s elections are largely 
noncompetitive.249 In light of the city’s characteristics and the 
limited applicability of findings from studies showing that 
nonpartisan elections reduce voter turnout, low voter turnout 
should not be an obstacle to considering nonpartisan elections as 
a viable means of reinvigorating the city’s municipal elections. 
                                                          
politically active. Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of 
Professor Frank Barry). When Chicago held its first nonpartisan election in 
1999, voter turnout was comparable to its turnout under their former partisan 
system. Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman). 
246 See Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor 
Frank Barry, explaining that whereas two-party systems exist largely to create 
competition, in single party systems, the “competition gets pushed into the 
primary system,” effectively excluding approximately one-third of all voters 
from the decisive election, who are not majority party members.). Nonpartisan 
systems would bring the excluded one-third back into the decision-making 
process. See id. 
247 POPULATION DIV., DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, POPULATION BY 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN, NEW YORK CITY & 
BOROUGHS, 1999 AND 2000 (indicating that the total population in the city is 
8,008,278), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popdiv.html (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2003); LEE, supra note 11, at 189-94 (noting that the 
populations of the six cities studied varied from 15,000 to 133,000). 
248 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 11, at 61. 
249 Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor 
Frank Barry). A competitive election is distinguishable from a noncompetitive 
one in its ability “to present contests to the voters in which the winners are not 
predetermined.” Persily, supra note 122, at 2190. New York elections are not 
competitive in that the winners typically win in a landslide victory at the 
general election, while the results are much closer in the primary election. See 
id.; Mercurio, Time Has Come, supra note 163. 
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b. Minority Voters Would Benefit 
Nonpartisan elections strengthen the ability of minorities to 
elect candidates.250 In the fifty largest cities in the country, more 
minority mayors have been elected through nonpartisan than 
partisan elections.251 Moreover, New York City minority voting 
patterns in nonpartisan special elections have shown no consistent 
decrease in minority voter turnout compared to white turnout.252 
Competitive minority candidates, however, tend to increase 
minority voter turnout.253 
Nonpartisan elections would increase participation by 
minority voters because voters that join the ranks of parties other 
than the Democratic Party or choose not to join a political party 
would be able to vote in a nonpartisan primary.254 Moreover, all 
minority voters stand to benefit. Blacks and Hispanics constitute 
twenty-three percent and twenty-five percent of the voting age 
population, respectively.255 With such a high percentage of the 
voting population, their votes are significant enough for any 
candidate to seek their support.256 
                                                          
250 See supra Part II.B (discussing minorities’ ability to elect candidates of 
their choice within nonpartisan systems). 
251 See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. 
Lichtman); supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing the success 
of minority candidates in nonpartisan elections compared with partisan 
elections). 
252 See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. 
Lichtman, reviewing the results of his statistical research of nonpartisan 
special election voter turnout between 1992 and 1998). 
253 Id.; see supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the inclusion of minority turnout 
concerns in the Department of Justice’s review process under Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the correlation between 
minority candidates and minority turnout). 
254 See Hearing (Aug. 13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of Genevieve 
Torres, a political activist from Brooklyn) (stating that “if you look in the 
black and Latino community, a majority of youth is deciding that they’d like to 
opt out of deciding on a party or they’d rather vote as independents”). 
255 See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. 
Lichtman). 
256 See Kresky, supra note 208 (noting that minority voters’ support is 
essential to any local electoral victory). 
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c. Candidates Would Receive Adequate Funding 
New York City provides financial assistance to candidates for 
municipal office through an innovative campaign finance 
program.257 In 2001, the program provided forty-one million 
dollars to candidates, far more than any funding provided by 
parties.258 The city’s purposes for implementing the program 
included “[making] candidates and elected officials more 
responsive to citizens, rather than special interests; . . . [helping] 
credible candidates who may not have access to ‘big money’ to 
run competitive campaigns; [and leveling] the political playing 
field by enabling all serious candidates, whether challengers or 
incumbents, to compete on more equal footing.”259 The city’s 
public financing system is the most generous and comprehensive 
reform program among American cities.260 Indeed, the policy 
goals of nonpartisan elections—encouraging competition, access 
and political responsiveness—closely resemble those that 
motivated passage of the city’s campaign finance reform and are 
equally legitimate.261 
                                                          
257 See The New York City Campaign Finance Board, For Candidates, at 
http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/for_candidates/index.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 
2003) (generally describing the types of financial assistance given to 
candidates). 
258 Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement of Dr. Lichtman 
citing statistics compiled by the Campaign Finance Board). 
259 The New York City Campaign Finance Board, The Program and the 
Law, at http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/program_law/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
24, 2003). 
260 Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Frank Barry). 
See also New York City Campaign Finance Board, Message from the 
[Campaign Finance Program] Chairman, at http://www.cfb.nyc.ny.us/about/ 
chairman_statement.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) (describing the purposes 
of the Program, and noting that its comprehensiveness makes it the “vanguard 
of the [campaign finance] reform movement”). In contrast, many cities have 
no public financing at all. See, e.g., Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002) supra note 90 
(statement of Orlando Mayor Glenda Hood that candidates in Orlando do not 
receive public funds to assist in their campaigns). 
261 Supra Part I.A.3 (highlighting Mayor Bloomberg’s premises for 
establishing nonpartisan elections). 
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d. New York Has a Wealth of Political Information 
Sufficient sources of information are available in New York 
City to fill in the gaps in the event that parties decided to reduce 
their informational role in elections. New York City has an 
undeniably active, “aggressive” and opinionated press.262 In 
addition, the Campaign Finance Board is required to inform 
voters about municipal candidates via the Voter Guide.263 
Historically, newspapers have been an important part of the 
election and political process.264 Today, press activity remains a 
significant variable in the election results of large cities.265 
                                                          
262 Hearing (Aug. 20, 2002), supra note 163 (statement of Professor 
Frank Barry). Consider the variety of perspectives available in the New York 
Times, New York Post, New York Daily News, Wall Street Journal, Newsday 
and the recently arrived New York Sun. See, e.g., Scott McConnell, Editorial, 
We’re Trying to Save Right Wing from Itself, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at 
A15 (noting “hefty neoconservative influence” over a few publications, 
including the New York Sun and the Wall Street Journal); Sridhar Pappu, As 
Blix Unloads, News Comes Back to U.N. Bureaus, N.Y. OBSERVER, Feb. 3, 
2003, at 3 (referring to the liberal leanings of the New York Times); Monty 
Phan, NY Sun Seeks Circulation Rise, NEWSDAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at A59 
(explaining that the New York Sun’s slogan, “‘Expect a different point of 
view’ . . . refers to the philosophy that a reader interested in the style of news 
provided by the New York Times would value a ‘second point of view’ 
provided by the Sun”); David Ward, Editorial, Remain a Coveted Voice for 
News Analysis, PR WEEK, Mar. 31, 2003, at 10 (positing that the N.Y. Times 
is generally conservative); Tony Blankley, Watch This Election’s Wheel of 
Fate, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A19 (referring to the N.Y. Daily News 
as liberal); Warren Strugatch, Manhattan Law Firm Makes a Successful Foray, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003 (describing a Newsday columnist as a “liberal 
foul”). 
263 NEW YORK CITY CHARTER tit. 52 § 10 (2002); N.Y.C. R. & REGS. 
tit. 52, § 10-02 (2002) (listing information that statutorily must be included in 
the Voter Guide). 
264 HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 53 (nothing that “[t]he primary sources of 
political information regarding local elections, especially where parties are 
inactive, are community organizations and the mass media”); LEE, supra note 
11, at 78 (listing local newspapers as one of the important influences in 
election politics). 
265 LEE, supra note 11, at 78 (explaining that local newspapers are valued 
more highly for their candidate endorsements in cities with larger 
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According to studies of municipal judicial elections, in ninety-
five percent of the cities with populations above 50,000 in which 
the press was active, “supported candidates were reported as 
winning ‘many times’ or ‘always.’”266 Therefore, New York 
City’s diverse, active press is a significant alternative to 
partisanship for informing the vote. 
The city’s Campaign Finance Board also provides the Voter 
Guide, required by the City Charter.267 The guide provides 
biographical information about each local candidate, including 
the name, political party enrollment, previous and current public 
offices held, current occupation, prior employment and positions, 
experience in public service, educational background and major 
organizational affiliations.268 It also includes “concise statements 
on the candidate’s principles, platform or views, for each 
candidate in the election who has submitted, in a timely manner, 
a candidate Voter Guide statement . . . .”269 This program is 
unique to New York City and ensures that the city’s electorate 
will not be uninformed in the event that political parties diminish 
their activity.270 In addition to the Voter Guide, the Campaign 
Finance Board funds candidates to further the candidate’s own 
efforts to produce and distribute information.271 
e. Republican Advantage? Not Here. 
There would be no Republican advantage in New York City 
                                                          
populations). See also Champagne, supra note 200, at 1421 (describing how 
the mass media can even be critical to the success of a judicial election). 
Judicial elections are comparable to many of the local elections such as city 
council elections because both are considered low-visibility races. See id. at 
1412; see also text accompanying note 240 (discussing the issue of low voter 
turnout in municipal elections, which generally corresponds to the low-
visibility nature of an election). 
266 LEE, supra note 11, at 148. 
267 NEW YORK CITY CHARTER tit. 52 § 10 (2002). 
268 Id. at § 10(b)(1). 
269 Id. at § 10(b)(2). 
270 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER tit. 52 § 10 (2002). 
271 See supra Part IV.C.3.c (discussing the Campaign Finance Board’s 
efforts in assisting candidates financially). 
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because the conditions that create such an advantage are absent. 
Belief in the universal existence of a Republican advantage in 
nonpartisan elections is based on the misunderstanding that 
nonpartisan elections eliminate political party involvement.272 
Studies in the 1960s as well as a more recent study showed a 
Republican advantage in nonpartisan elections.273 Those findings 
are repeated in media even today without proper consideration of 
the funding resources uniquely available in New York City, 
which were established specifically to reduce the influence of 
wealth in elections.274 This concern continues to be espoused in 
anti-Republican circles, though occasionally the arguments are 
dressed in sheep’s clothing.275 
Among the bases for fearing a Republican advantage is the 
concern that nonpartisan elections end party involvement and 
issue awareness.276 Common arguments regarding the Republican 
advantage combine the three additional concerns, i.e., candidate 
                                                          
272 See supra Part I.B (explaining that structurally, nonpartisan elections 
still allow political parties to carry on most of their campaign activities). 
273 See, e.g., HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the results and 
implications of his study, which showed the partisan bias of nonpartisanship in 
city council and mayoral positions in eighty-eight cities in California between 
1957-1966); Lascher, supra note 150 (discussing his study published in 1991, 
which surveyed California county supervisors elected by nonpartisan elections; 
county supervisor positions are functionally comparable to city council 
offices). 
274 See, e.g., Muzzio, Bloomberg Jumps Gun, supra note 56 
(“Nonpartisan systems, especially in large cities, seem to engender a 
Republican bias.”); see also supra Part IV.C.3.c (discussing why wealth, a 
proxy argument for the Republican advantage, is inapplicable). 
275 See, e.g., HAWLEY, supra note 1, at 33; Press Release, Denny 
Farrell, supra note 67 (emphasizing the benefits that political parties bring to 
elections, rather than stating any belief that Republicans may benefit from the 
change). 
276 This presumption can be inferred from the numerous comments that 
have been made by partisan advocates who emphasize the benefits that 
political parties bring to the electoral process in general as if parties will not 
choose to provide them under a nonpartisan system. See, e.g., CITY IN 
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 92; Amy Bridges, Editorial, In Elections, 
Parties Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at A18; Press Release, Denny 
Farrell, supra note 67. 
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wealth, reduced voter turnout and reduced candidate 
information.277 These are not problems in New York City.278 
Recent evidence from large, highly political cities like Chicago 
indicates that parties continue to play an active role in local 
nonpartisan elections.279 If parties remain committed to the results 
in local elections, they must also remain dedicated to informing 
the voters on their local issue positions in spite of the loss of the 
spoils system inherent in “formalized politics.”280 
In fact, there is a strong possibility that a nonpartisan primary 
would result in New Yorkers choosing two Democratic 
candidates to face off in a general election.281 As of November 
2002, the Republican Party had only 536,000 New Yorkers, 
whereas the Democratic Party had 2.8 million.282 With such 
lopsided numbers, candidates that face off in the current general 
                                                          
277 See supra Parts IV.C.3.a-d (describing these concerns but also 
explaining why conditions in New York City would not create significant 
turnout, funding or informational problems if nonpartisan elections were 
established). 
278 See Lascher, supra note 150 (contending that Republicans’ greater 
financial means with which to increase name recognition and improve 
candidate image may explain why Republican candidates have done better in 
nonpartisan elections relative to their share of registered Republican Party 
voters, as he found in his study of elections of California municipal officials); 
279 See Rick Pearson, Daley Triumphs in Landslide, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 
1999, at 1 (noting that in Chicago’s first nonpartisan municipal election, 
“[Mayor] Daley . . . used his powerful political organization” to win the 
election). 
280 See Northup, supra note 28, at 1680 (describing the political party as 
an institution not only of policies, but of patronage and personnel as well); see 
also Hearing (Aug.13, 2002), supra note 132 (statement of City Council 
member David Yassky acknowledging that “parties can . . . serve a non-
helpful role as patronage organizations”). 
281 For example, in Los Angeles’s 2001 nonpartisan mayoral primary, 
two Democrats faced off in the runoff election. L.A. Mayoral Race Heads to 
Runoff, CHI. SUN-TIMES, April 12, 2001, at 24. In cities where one party is 
dominant, competition like that in two-party contests is possible if there is 
lively debate over controversial local issues, thus providing more of the checks 
and balances that party contests normally offer. PHILLIPS, supra note 172, at 
207. 
282 Enrollment Statistics, supra note 187. 
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election system, which advances only one candidate from each 
party, hardly represents the majority of New Yorkers’ views. 
Nonpartisan elections have greater potential to more accurately 
represent the public’s policy perspectives, create a more 
competitive election and keep candidates accountable. 
V. DRAFTING THE NONPARTISAN ELECTION LAW: STRUCTURAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
If and when the Charter Revision Commission decides to 
propose establishing nonpartisan elections, they will have the 
flexibility to structure the nonpartisan election law in a way that 
best suits the New York City context. In drafting the charter 
sections, the Commission may determine the scope of the 
nonpartisan laws, whether to use a primary and the number of 
voter signatures required to be placed on a ballot.283 
A. The Commission’s 2002 Draft Proposal: The Contents 
The commission included a draft charter chapter establishing 
nonpartisan elections for local elective offices in the September 
3, 2002 report.284 As set forth in this draft, candidates would be 
nominated by nonpartisan designating petitions, with a specified 
number of registered voters’ signatures required for placement on 
the primary ballot.285 The signature requirements for candidates 
using the nonpartisan designating petition derive from State 
Election Law § 6-142, which governs independent nominating 
                                                          
283 See infra Parts V.A-B and accompanying text (summarizing the 
various nonpartisan election laws utilized in Chicago, Ill.; Houston, Tex.; Los 
Angeles, Cal.; and Seattle, Wash.). 
284 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 98. 
285  CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 99 (setting forth section sixty-
one of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). “Nonpartisan designating 
petitions are analogous to independent nominating petitions.” Id. at 109 
(discussing section sixty-one of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). 
New York State Election Law currently determines the number of signatures 
that must be collected on an independent nominating petition to be placed on 
the ballot. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 (McKinney 2003). 
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petitions and which requires a higher number of signatures than 
does a partisan designating petition.286 The offices that would 
utilize the nonpartisan election system would include mayor, 
comptroller, public advocate, city council member and borough 
president.287 Every qualified voter would be entitled to vote in the 
nonpartisan primary election.288 The candidates receiving the 
largest and second largest number of votes would advance to a 
general runoff election.289 No party labels or symbols would be 
                                                          
286 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142.When using a independent nominating 
petition to qualify to be placed on a ballot, the state election law requires 
7,500 signatures for any citywide public office and 4,000 signatures for any 
county or borough office, the same numbers needed when using a partisan 
designating petition. Compare N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 and N.Y. ELEC. 
LAW § 6-136 (McKinney 2003). For any city council district office, however, 
two thousand seven hundred signatures are needed when using a nonpartisan 
designating petition compared with only nine hundred signatures needed when 
using a partisan designating petition. Id. 
287  CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 99 (providing section sixty-one 
of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 103 (setting forth section sixty-six of the “Draft Nonpartisan 
Elections Chapter,” which requires that “[t]he board of elections shall certify 
the names of the persons who received the largest and next largest number of 
votes for mayor, comptroller, public advocate, member of the city council, 
and borough president, respectively”). Rather than hold a runoff election with 
only the top two candidates, as provided in the draft charter chapter, Dr. 
Lichtman suggests that by having the top three candidates who obtain over 
twenty-five percent of the vote move into the runoff, minorities would enhance 
their opportunity to be effective in the primary and general election. 
PRELIMINARY OPTIONS, supra note 2, at A-4. He contends that the significant 
size and strength of minority groups might make a three-way split beneficial 
because it would allow a candidate to be elected with a plurality of votes. Id. 
He argues that because studies of minority electoral patterns in New York City 
show that minorities do not consistently vote cohesively, minorities are 
generally not able to control the party vote despite their strong affiliation with 
the Democratic Party. See Hearing (Aug. 15, 2002), supra note 90 (statement 
of Dr. Lichtman). Ensuring an “equal opportunity to participate meaningfully 
in the political process in the jurisdiction,” 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(1) (2003), 
and “influence elections and the decisionmaking of elected officials in the 
jurisdiction,” 28 C.F.R. § 51.58(b)(2) (2003), are of primary concern in 
rewriting the election rules. A runoff election with two candidates, however, 
will ensure that these opportunities are safeguarded, while additionally 
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allowed on the ballot or voting machine at the primary or general 
election.290 
B. Reflections on the Commission’s 2002 Draft Proposal 
In considering how the City Charter should be revised, the 
policy goals of nonpartisan elections should be evident in the 
construction of the revisions. First, cities may designate the 
scope of nonpartisan elections by applying an election system to 
all, or only selected, municipal offices.291 Although the charter 
could be revised to apply only to those offices that repeatedly 
suffer from lack of competition, structural consistency and 
efficiency would be furthered by applying a nonpartisan system 
to all municipal elections.292 New York City voting patterns 
indicate that there is virtually no competition at the general 
                                                          
producing a winner that has received majority support from the electorate. 
Blacks and Hispanics constitute a substantial proportion of the voting 
population—twenty-three percent and twenty-five percent, respectively. CITY 
IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at C-14. These proportions are significant 
enough for candidates to rationally desire to secure their support, even if the 
minority groups do not vote cohesively. 
290  CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 104 (providing section sixty-
nine of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter”). 
291 For example, Chicago, Ill.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Seattle, Wash.; and 
Houston, Tex., have established nonpartisan elections for both mayor and 
members of city council. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 20/21-5 (2003); L.A. 
ELEC. CODE §§ 424, 426 (2000); SEATTLE CITY CHARTER art. XIX § 1 
(2002), HOUSTON CITY CHARTER § 5 (2001). Chicago and Los Angeles also 
extend nonpartisan elections to the comptroller and city treasurer offices. 65 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 20/21-5 (2003); L.A. ELEC. CODE § 424, 426 
(2000). Houston also extends nonpartisan elections to city controller. 
HOUSTON CITY CHARTER § 5 (2001). Los Angeles and Seattle also extend 
nonpartisan elections to the city attorney office. L.A. ELEC. CODE § 424, 426 
(2000); SEATTLE CITY CHARTER art. XIX § 1 (2002). 
292 A hybrid partisan-nonpartisan local election system was used in 
Chicago prior to 1995, in which a nonpartisan system was used to elect 
aldermen, while a partisan system was used to elect its citywide offices, 
including mayor, city clerk and treasurer. Fornek, supra note 33. The state 
legislature voted to change the citywide office elections to the nonpartisan 
format for structural efficiency purposes. Id. The costs of running a single 
system are lower than that for the hybrid system. Id. 
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election for city council, comptroller, public advocate, and 
borough president.293 Even if a nonpartisan format would not 
necessarily enhance the competitiveness of the mayoral race, 
utilizing the nonpartisan system for all offices would provide a 
more efficient administrative approach.294 
Of the forty-one largest cities administering nonpartisan 
elections, the majority only require a general runoff election if no 
candidate receives a majority of votes in the primary.295 
Contingent runoff elections were created in response to the 
inefficiencies of holding two elections that produced the same 
result, which is particularly common in cities where voters are 
heavily registered with one party.296 The 2002 Draft Charter does 
not provide for this contingency,297 but the commission should 
                                                          
293 Mercurio, Bloomberg’s Campaign Promise, supra note 10. See supra 
note 216 (describing voting statistics for the 2001 primary and general 
election, showing major disparities in votes between the winners and the 
runners-up in municipal general elections). 
294 See supra note 292 (discussing Chicago’s streamlined nonpartisan 
system). The mayoral office has seen more competition, as evidenced by the 
Republican Party affiliation of the current and last mayor in the Democratic 
Party-dominated city. See supra note 194 (citing voting statistics for the 
2001mayoral election and comparing them to those in other citywide and 
councilmanic offices). See also Hearing (Aug. 21, 2002), supra note 135 
(statement of former New York City Mayor Koch noting that the current 
structure offers sufficient checks and balances, reflected in the city’s voting 
pattern, which has “been to elect a Republican every 30 years when the 
Democrats have really screwed it up bad”). But see Shipper, supra note 185 
(quoting former Mayor Giuliani, who disagreed with the belief that the 
mayoral race was competitive, stating that he was “only the third Republican 
mayor in 100 years”). 
295 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at E12-E15. See supra note 71 
(listing those cities that do not hold a general election if a candidate has 
received a majority of votes in the primary). 
296 See Fornek, supra note 33 (explaining that the primary reason for 
establishing this contingent general election format was “to simplify elections 
and save taxpayers money”); see also Hardy, supra note 33 (observing that in 
Democratic Party-dominated Chicago, “Republicans haven’t won a Chicago 
mayoral race since 1927”). 
297 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102 (setting forth section 
sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which establishes a 
nonpartisan primary); id. at 104 (setting forth section sixty-eight of the “Draft 
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consider its potential benefits. Contingent runoff elections could 
provide financial benefits to the city.298 Moreover, since the 
nonpartisan primary would be open to all qualified voters,299 the 
runoff would not be essential to ensure equal voting access. 
The signature requirement for independent nominating 
petitions also implicates ballot access issues. The experience with 
nonpartisan elections in Chicago revealed that an onerously high 
signature requirement threatened to render their mayoral election 
uncontested.300 Candidate ballot access problems harm not only 
potential candidates, but also voters, who may not have the 
opportunity to vote for candidates of their choosing.301 This 
attenuates the representative nature of the democracy.302 
                                                          
Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which provides that “nominees . . . shall 
advance to the general election”) (emphasis added). 
298 See Fornek, supra note 33 (quoting a spokesman for the Chicago 
Board of Elections who stated that “[t]he city could save $2 million to $2.5 
million if no runoffs were required for the citywide offices”). More likely than 
not, however, the larger number of candidates typically on a primary ballot, 
the division of votes among those candidates, and the numerous offices being 
filled at each election will inevitably require a runoff for at least one office. 
Id. (noting that “those savings would disappear if even one race required a 
runoff”). 
299 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 102-03 (setting forth section 
sixty-five of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which states that 
“[e]very qualified voter shall be entitled to vote at such nonpartisan primary 
election”). 
300 Steve Neal, Editorial, Change Unfair Petition Rules: Candidates for 
City Offices Need 25,000 Signatures to Run, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 29, 2002 
(describing the problems candidates faced with access to the ballot due to the 
high signature requirement for Chicago’s citywide elective offices). The 
nonpartisan legislation failed to specify the number of signatures needed for a 
candidate to gain access to the ballot. Id. The Chicago Board of Elections thus 
imposed a legacy rule upon all citywide offices, which required all candidates 
to collect 25,000 signatures, a rule previously imposed only on candidates 
running as an independent or new party candidate. Id. In contrast, only 5,000 
signatures are required to run for statewide offices. Id. 
301 See Persily, supra note 122, at 2188-89 (explaining that “ballot access 
laws . . . hinder . . . political participation by restricting the voter’s 
opportunity to cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice”). 
302 Id. at 2189 (noting that the distinctive trait of democratic participation 
in elections from Communist systems is “the existence of some meaningful 
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In a typical partisan contest, the signature requirements are 
significantly higher for candidates not endorsed by a party, which 
has raised concerns that “the primary becomes little more than a 
state-sponsored endorsement of the candidate of the party 
leadership.”303 The differential signature requirement does not 
appear to be an issue under a nonpartisan system because all 
candidates would have to collect the same number of signatures, 
regardless of party endorsements.304 Implementing the higher 
signature requirement for all candidates, however, could 
potentially recreate the partisan system bias in the nonpartisan 
structure if only those candidates supported by the dominant 
political party are able to attain the signature threshold.305 
Therefore, the Commission should consider the broader ballot 
access concern that derives from an overly high signature 
requirement in general and counterbalance the need for a 
signature requirement that is high enough to avoid the use of 
laundry list ballots.306 
CONCLUSION 
The problematic reality of New York City’s current local 
election system becomes evident when the invalid assumptions 
and their supposed negative effects on voter turnout, minority 
power and the Republican advantage are laid aside. As a system 
overwhelmingly dominated by one party across a majority of 
local elective offices, the current system fails to create the 
competition necessary to keep candidates and officials locally 
                                                          
range of choices for which a voter can express a preference”). 
303 Persily, supra note 122, at 2201. For example, New York State’s 
current election law requires three times as many signatures for city council 
candidates who lack party backing. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 (McKinney 
2003). 
304 See CITY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 99-100 (setting forth section 
sixty-one of the “Draft Nonpartisan Elections Chapter,” which provides for 
uniform petition signature requirements).  
 305 See id. 
306 See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the problems of laundry list ballots, 
and the movement to implement short ballots, particularly in nonpartisan 
elections). 
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accountable and does not open the election process to all voters in 
the primary, where the vote really matters. The city’s partisan 
system restricts access to candidates that could bring positive 
change. Nonpartisan elections would pave the way to return the 
electoral decision to all of New York City’s voters and ensure a 
responsive government. 
 
